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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Single subject rules are—theoretically—a fundamental parameter of 
the legislative process in most states.1  Forty-one of the fifty state 
constitutions, or eighty-two percent, contain a general single subject rule.2  
However, observers have long noted that in most states, single subject 
rules effectively have been rendered dormant, in large measure due to the 
courts’ refusal to enforce the rule.3  More recently, some state courts have 
disapprovingly observed the same trend of the single subject rule 
devolving to a defunct constitutional letter.4  This is significant since the 
                                                 
1 The single subject rule commands that acts passed by a state’s legislature must be 
limited to one subject.  Indiana’s version of the single subject rule is representative:  “[a]n 
act, except an act for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to 
one subject and matters properly connected therewith.”  IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19, 
amended Nov. 5, 1974.  Some states, such as Indiana, create exceptions to the rule (most often 
for statutory codifications and for appropriations bills).  THE HISTORY OF INDIANA LAW 374 
(Daniel J. Bodenhamer & Randall T. Sheppard eds., 2006).  Other states tie the single subject 
rule to the added requirement that an act’s title must express the subject.  See, e.g., ALA. 
CONST. art. IV, § 45 (“Each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed 
in its title . . .”).  Such a provision is known as the “title requirement.”  Marcia J. Oddi, 
Enforcing Indiana’s Constitutional Requirement that Laws be Limited to One Subject, 44 RES GESTÆ 
18 (March 2001). 
2 In re A.B. v. Indiana, 949 N.E.2d 1204, 1221 & n.1 (Ind. 2011) (Dickson, J., concurring) 
(listing and citing to the forty-one provisions, and noting that only “[t]he constitutions of 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont lack a general single subject rule”).  The constitutions 
of Arkansas and Mississippi apply a narrow single subject restriction to most appropriations 
bills.  ARK. CONST. art. V, § 30; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 69. 
3 See, e.g., THOMAS C. MARKS, JR. & JOHN F. COOPER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 108 (2d ed. 2003) (“In general, it seems that legislatures are given a great deal of 
leeway in the application of . . . the single subject rule.”); M. Albert Figinski, Maryland’s 
Constitutional One-Subject Rule:  Neither a Dead Letter Nor an Undue Restriction, 27 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 363, 367–68 (1998) (contending that Maryland’s courts ought not to continue the trend 
of absolute judicial deference to the legislature on single subject matters); Jeffrey G. Knowles, 
Note, Enforcing the One-Subject Rule:  The Case for a Subject Veto, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 563, 564 
(1987) (“As a practical matter . . . [the single subject rule and gubernatorial veto] do not 
prevent state legislatures from engaging in logrolling or using riders.  Political pressure and 
judicial deference to the legislature combine to limit the efficacy of the one-subject rule in 
curbing these activities.”). 
4 For example, the Indiana Court of Appeals has noted, with some frustration, that 
Indiana’s single subject rule is essentially a void constitutional letter despite a robust body 
of precedent solemnizing its significance.  Ind. State Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs 
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regular enforcement of state single subject rules would very likely 
encourage the improved legislative process envisioned by the rules’ 
proponents, and would also restore the vision of checks and balances that 
motivated many states’ framers to include the single subject rule in their 
respective constitutions. 
Most states’ jurisprudence gives at least some weight—and in many 
states, substantial weight—to the intent of the constitution’s authors and 
ratifiers in determining the meaning of constitutional language.5  
Curiously, however, very few states appear to have relied upon their 
framers’ and ratifiers’ intent in determining the single subject rule’s 
meaning.6  Most states’ case law has inferred a variety of meanings and 
purposes underlying the single subject rule.7  But the critical omission of 
the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent from these analyses has led many states 
astray.  In most states, the single subject rule is enforced by the courts 
haphazardly or, equally as bad, not at all.8  A generalizable test would thus 
be helpful.  Before a reliable framework can be fashioned to guide the 
enforcement of the single subject rule, however, it is necessary that the 
rule’s true meaning be ascertained.  To articulate that meaning, we must 
first have a thorough command of what the framers and ratifiers of the 
rule intended.  Yet the rule’s meaning remains obscured in the historical 
record.9  Of all the provisions common to state constitutions, the single 
subject rule is unique because it presents an inviting opportunity for 
legitimate judicial reanimation.10 
                                                 
of the City of Indianapolis, 679 N.E.2d 933, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (“Notwithstanding [the 
many] pronouncements of the importance of the purposes underlying [the single subject 
rule], our [S]upreme [C]ourt has taken a laissez-faire approach to determining whether a 
violation of the single-subject requirement has occurred.”) 
5 Embry v. O’Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind. 2003).  In Indiana, for example, “[t]he 
intent of the framers of the Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a 
provision.”  Id. (quoting City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443, 
447 (Ind. 2001)). 
6 See infra Part VI (discussing the meanings that other states attach to their single subject 
rules). 
7 See infra Part VI (discussing the inferential means employed in other states in the 
interpretation of their single subject rules). 
8 See Ind. State Teachers Ass’n, 679 N.E.2d at 935 (observing that in Indiana, the Supreme 
Court has resisted the active enforcement of the single subject rule). 
9 See infra Parts III–IV (discussing first the origins of the single subject rule, followed by 
the ratification of Indiana’s rule in 1851). 
10 See, e.g., In re A.B. v. Indiana, 949 N.E.2d 1204, 1224–25 (Ind. 2011) (Dickson, J., 
concurring) (urging that Indiana’s courts have an affirmative duty to enforce the state’s 
single subject rule). 
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In fairness to the courts, the historical record surrounding this 
provision is relatively scant.11  This is surprising in light of how frequently 
the single subject rule appears throughout state constitutions.12  Of course, 
the paucity of historical evidence does not imply that the rule’s framers 
and ratifiers lacked an intent; rather, it means only that, for varying 
reasons, their intent was not well documented or preserved.13  
Consequently, many courts have guessed as to the intent behind, and 
therefore as to the actual meaning of, the single subject rule.  Even where 
the courts have correctly identified the rule’s purposes, they seldom 
capture the rationale that motivated the framers and ratifiers.  Without the 
benefit of this rationale, various conjectural interpretations of the rule 
have arisen to rationalize its lax enforcement.14  Weak enforcement does 
not make for sound constitutional law, particularly at a time when the 
single subject rule is sorely needed—as it was intended—in the defense of 
the public welfare. 
As a result, it is difficult to understand the framers’ intent for the 
single subject rule.  One method is pure inference or guesswork.  Another 
possibility is to identify a state that enjoys an extensive and clear record of 
its framers’ and ratifiers’ thinking as a source of persuasive authority for 
other states.  While we cannot unconditionally impute the thinking of one 
state’s framers and ratifiers to those of other states, it does seem reasonable 
to presume some commonalities among them, especially where later 
states fashioned similar language for their respective single subject rules.15  
Understanding one state in depth can help us to arrive at a deeper 
understanding of this provision.  For the reasons discussed next, one state, 
Indiana, stands alone in its potential to reveal the full purpose of the single 
subject rule, and the depth to which the framers and ratifiers were 
committed to its robust judicial enforcement.16 
                                                 
11 See infra Part IV (discussing the Indiana Convention of 1851 and the comparatively 
robust convention debates surrounding the adoption of Indiana’s rule).  
12 See supra note 2 (noting the rule’s commonality among state constitutions). 
13 One possibility is that the rule had become so common by the late nineteenth century 
that new constitutional conventions included it in their constitutions as a matter of course.  
Another likely explanation is that some states produced only journals that described the 
general procedural events of their constitutional conventions, neglecting to record the actual 
substance of the debates that took place. 
14 See, e.g., Ind. State Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of the City of Indianapolis, 
679 N.E.2d 933, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting the courts “laissez-faire” approach). 
15 N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 15 (“[n]o private or local bill, which may be passed by the 
legislature, shall embrace more than one subject”).  
16 See infra Part II (demonstrating the framers’ and ratifiers’ desire to have the single 
subject rule implemented). 
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This Article examines the Indiana example in detail, as well as the 
meanings that other states have attached to their single subject rules.17  
Part II discusses Indiana’s single subject rule as the example upon which 
this paper’s discussion will most heavily rely.18  Part III then considers the 
circumstances prevailing in Indiana around 1850, when the present 
constitution was drafted.19  In light of this historical context, Part IV 
examines the framers’ intent with respect to the single subject rule, as 
demonstrated by their own words at the 1850 Constitutional Convention, 
and establishes a definitive intent on the part of the framers—an intent not 
only that the single subject rule should prevent legislative logrolling, but 
also that the provision would receive unwavering judicial enforcement.20  
Then, Part V considers the evolution of Section 19’s language and 
demonstrates that the original intent of the framers survives by virtue of 
the continuity of the single subject rule over time.21  Following, Part VI 
considers the purposes that other states have attached to their single 
subject rules, and the resulting meanings ascribed to the rule.22  Finally, 
Part VII concludes that a test for the single subject rule is a plausible idea.23 
II.  THE HOOSIER EXAMPLE 
Indiana’s experience with the single subject rule is noteworthy for at 
least two reasons.  First, Indiana appears to have the most extensive 
historical record surrounding the debate and adoption of the rule.24  Thus, 
the Indiana framers’ thinking can be articulated with high degrees of 
precision and confidence.  States in which the historical record is quiet on 
the single subject rule may find the thinking of Indiana’s framers and 
ratifiers highly persuasive.  Second, Indiana’s case law is relatively 
voluminous and vibrantly illustrates the many barriers to the single 
subject rule’s enforcement today.25  By studying the Indiana example, we 
can arrive at a very clear understanding of the extent to which the rule’s 
                                                 
17 See supra Part I (introducing the Article). 
18 See infra Parts II–V (discussing Indiana’s single subject rule). 
19 See infra Part III (introducing the origins of Indiana’s single subject rule). 
20 See infra Part IV (describing in detail the Convention and how both the 1851 Indiana 
Constitution was ratified along with Section 19’s single subject rule).  
21 See infra Part V (explaining the linguistic changes to Section 19). 
22 See infra Part VI (examining how other states have applied and used the single subject 
rule). 
23 See infra Part VII (concluding the Article). 
24 See infra Part IV (introducing the history of the Constitutional Convention of 1850 and 
the involved discussion surrounding the creation and ratification of the single subject rule). 
25 See supra Part I (noting the barriers to the rule’s enforcement in Indiana today). 
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treatment in modern decisional law deviates from what its framers and 
ratifiers intended.26 
Indiana’s constitutional history consists of two successive 
documents.27  The 1816 Constitution suffered from a variety of defects.28  
Demand for reform, particularly of the legislative branch, culminated in 
the late 1840s and a convention was held in 1850–51.29  The 1850 
Convention produced a new constitution, which the voters of Indiana 
ratified in 1851.30  The 1851 Constitution, with its subsequent 
amendments, remains in force today.31 
Crafting Article 4 of the new Constitution—the legislative article—
commanded the Convention delegates’ disproportionate attention.32  The 
Convention’s final product introduced myriad reforms to the legislative 
branch, which more precisely should be labeled “myriad restrictions.”  
These restrictions, both procedural and substantive in nature, curtailed 
the latitude with which the General Assembly could make law.  Virtually 
no restrictions had been placed upon the General Assembly by the 1816 
Constitution, so the new document represented a substantial departure 
from its predecessor.33  As we will see, the most significant of these 
                                                 
26 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19.  Indiana itself is not exempt from this trend.  The case 
law interpreting Section 19 not only neglects original intent, but arrives at a construction that 
is, in most respects, deeply conflicted with the intent of the framers and ratifiers.   See supra 
Parts II–III (providing the framers’ intent for implementing the single subject provision). 
27 IND. CONST. of 1851; IND. CONST. of 1816.  
28 CHARLES KETTLEBOROUGH, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA 72–73 (1916) 
[hereinafter CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA]. 
29 See infra Part IV (detailing the events of the 1850 Convention and ratification). 
30 See infra id. (highlighting the events that led to the ratification of the 1851 Constitution). 
31  See infra id. (discussing the  ratification of the 1851 Constitution). 
32 1 CHARLES KETTLEBOROUGH, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA:  A SOURCE BOOK OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS WITH HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL NOTES 310 
(1916) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS] (discussing Article 4 of 
the 1851 Constitution). 
33 Compare IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, §§ 9–25 (demonstrating the change from the 
Indiana Constitution of 1816), with IND. CONST. of 1816, art. III (providing the text of the 
original Constitution).  Moreover:   
In drafting the Constitution of 1851, the delegates responded to 
widespread demand for major limitations on the General Assembly.  
Among them were . . . restrictions on how laws were 
enacted . . .  Although the delegates agreed, by a vote of 124 to 0, that 
the “legislative authority” of the state was vested in the General 
Assembly they hemmed in and limited this authority with sundry 
restrictions and prohibitions.  [One delegate] declared:  “Almost the 
entire weight of this Convention seems to be directed against the 
legislative department, as if, in that department alone, originated all the 
evils of government.” 
2 DONALD F. CARMONY, INDIANA, 1816–1850:  THE PIONEER ERA 410 (1998) [hereinafter 
INDIANA, THE PIONEER ERA]. 
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restrictions—Indiana’s version of the single subject rule—is found in 
Section 19 of Article 4 (“Section 19”).34 
III.  ORIGINS OF INDIANA’S SINGLE SUBJECT RULE:  CONDITIONS IN 1850 
Indiana was granted statehood in 1816.35  For a time, the 1816 
Constitution was a popular instrument.36  However, by the 1840s the 
demand for a new constitution reached a crescendo.37  Esteemed Indiana 
historian David Carmony suggests that four factors produced the 
sentiment of the 1840s.38  First, Indiana was facing a fiscal crisis arising 
from its financing of the Wabash and Erie Canals.39  Roughly two million 
dollars had been embezzled by state officers and agents related to the 
Canals in the 1840–42 timeframe, the project was over-budget, and it failed 
to produce revenue.40  As a result, there existed a “strong and persistent 
demand that the constitution be amended to add severe restrictions 
against the power of the legislature to create a state debt.”41  Second, many 
citizens desired to end the monopoly of the Second State Bank.42  Third, 
the political culture of the state was changing.43  In “the 1840s, Indiana 
came increasingly under the sway of Jacksonian Democracy with its 
emphasis upon individual rights, popular election, restrictions of legislative 
bodies, and private enterprise.”44  Carmony’s final factor reflected a desire 
to reduce the cost of state government.45  Since 1816, many frugal Hoosiers 
had urged that the legislature meet once every other year, instead of once 
each year.46  The other major cost-savings initiative called for “strict 
limitations against . . . passage of local and special laws.”47 
Unsurprisingly, these factors were synergistic.  For instance, although 
the Canals’ financing had been a bipartisan measure, the then-minority 
                                                 
34 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19; CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA, supra note 28, at 
88 (introducing the new 1851 Constitution). 
35 IND. CONST. of 1816 (stating in the preface that Indiana joined the Union in 1816). 
36 DONALD F. CARMONY, THE INDIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1850–51, 10 
(discussing the 1816 Constitution) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1850]. 
37 Id. at 10 (demonstrating the unrest by the General Assembly submitting referendum 
proposals to the people three times during the 1840s). 
38 INDIANA, THE PIONEER ERA, supra note 33, at 405. 
39 GEORGE S. COTTMAN, CENTENNIAL HISTORY AND HANDBOOK OF INDIANA 111 (1915). 
40 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1850, supra note 36, at 405; COTTMAN, supra note 39, 
at 111. 
41 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1850, supra note 36, at 405. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. (emphasis added). 
45 Id. 
46 Id.; CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA, supra note 28, at 60–62. 
47 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1850, supra note 36, at 405. 
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Democrats blamed the then-majority Whigs for the disastrous 
consequences, and by the mid-1840s the Democrats had taken the 
governor’s chair and the majority in the state legislature.48  By the close of 
the 1840s, “the Democrats were in control of both branches of the General 
Assembly, and [were] capable, therefore, of carrying to fruition the 
constitutional measures which they had inaugurated in 1849 and which 
had been approved by the electorate at the ensuing general election.”49 
A constitutional referendum was held in 1846, and although it did not 
garner enough support for the calling of a constitutional convention, it 
foreshadowed the growing wave of displeasure, leading to the success of 
a later referendum in 1849.50  By the 1846 referendum, many citizens, 
journalists, and public officials had become vocal in proposing changes to 
the 1816 Constitution.51  The fact that the 1816 document also contained 
some insufficiently democratic provisions did not help its case in the face 
of the rising populist movement.52  A dominant motive is discernable from 
the public’s proposals—restraint of the legislature by limiting its 
discretion.53  In contrast to the product of the 1850 Convention, the 1816 
                                                 
48 Id.; see also LOGAN ESAREY, A HISTORY OF INDIANA FROM ITS EXPLORATION TO 1850, 462–
75 (1915) [hereinafter ESAREY, EXPLORATION TO 1850] (noting Indiana’s poor financial state 
and the resulting partisan maneuvering). 
49 CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA, supra note 28, at 72–73; see also SOURCE BOOK OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 32, at clxxv (noting the Democrats’ contributions 
to the Constitution of 1851).  The introduction to the Source Book observes that: 
The Constitution of 1851 was considered as the handiwork of the 
Democrats since that party commanded a large majority in the 
Convention.  This sentiment is clearly in evidence from the tenor of an 
editorial comment of the Indianapolis Journal (Whig) on March 7, 1853.  
In this State a Convention to amend the Constitution was held.  The 
Democrats had a large majority.  They could do just as they pleased.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
50 CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA, supra note 28, at 68. 
51 See id. at 60–62 (listing proposed reforms). 
52 Id. at 18–19.  For example, Article VIII of the 1816 Constitution was criticized for 
“[p]rohibiting the calling of a constitutional convention to alter, revise or amend the 
Constitution until the expiration of a full period of [twelve] years.  This unwise prohibition 
was neither a legislative act nor a legitimate exercise of power by a Convention, but an 
unalienable power which resides solely in the people.”  Id. 
53 See, e.g., JOHN D. BARNHART & DONALD F. CARMONY, INDIANA’S CENTURY OLD 
CONSTITUTION 6–7 (1951) (noting that the Legislature was the main target of criticism); 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1850, supra note 36, at 11  (“The worst evil of these practices 
was the impetus it gave to logrolling, lobbying, and trading of votes”); 1 LOGAN ESAREY, 
HISTORY OF INDIANA:  FROM ITS EXPLORATION TO 1922, 510 (1918) [hereinafter ESAREY, 
EXPLORATION TO 1922] (“[T]he chief ground of complaint was the working of the General 
Assembly” which “was neglecting the affairs of the State and giving its time and attention to 
hundreds of petty private affairs.  A reading of the titles of the special laws of any session 
will give one an idea of the petty jobbery that was carried on by means of special laws.”); 
WILLIAM S. HOLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF INDIANA OF 1850–’51:  THE 
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Constitution “was a concise document, emphasizing basic principles with 
few restrictive details, thus leaving the legislature much discretion in 
adapting laws to changing circumstances.”54  It was against this expansive 
legislative discretion that the majority Democrats were sent by voters to 
the 1850 Convention. 
Leading the desired legislative restraints was the prohibition of 
special and local legislation, “one of the evils most frequently complained 
of.”55  In Jacksonian fashion, the Democrats embraced these populist 
sentiments in their campaigns of the late 1840s.  The Indiana Democrats’ 
commitment to placing constitutional restraints upon the legislature was 
cemented when Governor James Whitcomb—a popular leader and the 
first Democrat elected to the Indiana governorship—formally proposed 
the calling of a constitutional convention.56  Of particular significance is 
that Whitcomb explicitly named special and local legislation as the 
principal problem to be addressed—“[l]ocal and special legislation had 
increased 350% during the preceding five years,” and “[t]he calling of a 
constitutional convention would be ‘abundantly justified’ if it produced 
no other result than to furnish ‘an effectual remedy for this growing 
evil.’”57 
The significance of this historical context is unmistakable.58  The 
substantive prohibition of special and local legislation was incorporated 
into the 1851 Constitution under its own headings.59  However, the 
procedural phenomenon for creating special and local legislation—
                                                 
REFORMS IT ACCOMPLISHED 4 (Gibson Bros. 1886) (“During this period of 34 years [between 
1816 and 1850], the people of Indiana had . . . seen the authority of the State broken into 
fragments in countless forms of special laws and local institutions . . . ”); 2 CHARLES ROLL, 
INDIANA:  ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY YEARS OF AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT 118 (1931) (“Others 
complained of the constant effort of the Convention to weaken the State Legislature[]” but 
“[t]he sentiment in favor of restricting the legislative branch of the government was too 
strong to be overborne by arguments however plausible they might be.”). 
54 INDIANA, THE PIONEER ERA, supra note 38, at 403. 
55 CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA, supra note 28, at 142; see also COTTMAN, supra note 
39, at 119 (“The argument for supplanting the old constitution was that under it certain 
conditions had sprung up that in time became evils.  Chief of these was legislation of a purely 
local or even personal character.”). 
56  CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA, supra note 28, at 68. 
57 Id. at 69. 
58 See Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 38 (Ind. 1999) (“Because the ‘intent of the framers 
of the Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a provision’, [the Indiana 
Supreme] Court will consider the purpose which induced the adoption, in order that we may 
ascertain what the particular constitutional provision was designed to prevent.” (citations 
omitted)). 
59 See IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, §§ 22–23 (treating local and special laws in their own 
sections). 
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logrolling—was also an evil to be corrected.60  Because the 1816 
Constitution offered no institutional resistance to logrolling, the vast 
majority of legislation passed under the former Constitution consisted of 
special and local acts, each beneficial to only a handful of legislators.61  
Consequently, it is not an overstatement to say that the major impetus for 
a new constitution—the 1851 Constitution—was not simply a “better-
regulated” legislature, but in particular a legislature restrained from 
logrolling special and local legislation into existence.  However, the public’s 
resentment—and that of their delegates—was not satiated by a mere 
prohibition against the hated special or local legislation.62  The substantive 
problem—private legislation—and its procedural enabler—logrolling—
were twin evils, both of which were to be curtailed under the new order.  
The circumstances surrounding the introduction of the special or local 
prohibition and the single subject rule at the 1850 Convention further 
corroborate this observation.63 
Logrolling was viewed by the public not simply as a means to the end 
of special or local legislation; it was also a discrete evil in itself.  Two strong 
pieces of circumstantial evidence demonstrate this.  First, the 1851 
Constitution included the single subject rule partly as a procedural check 
against the legislature, despite the substantive restrictions against special 
or local legislation.64  If the framers and ratifiers were concerned 
exclusively with the substantive evil of special or local legislation, it would 
seem unnecessary to include a procedural prohibition against logrolling 
                                                 
60 See generally infra Part IV (examining the framers’ intent with respect to the single 
subject rule preventing legislative logrolling, and the rule’s justiciability).  The framers’ 
primary intentions for the single subject rule were to prohibit logrolling and the joining 
together of insufficiently related items in the same act.   
61 JUSTIN E. WALSH, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE INDIANA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1816–
1978, 100–01 (1987).  In its thirty-four years under the 1816 Constitution, the legislature 
produced 9094 laws.  Id.  In contrast, in the forty years from 1850–1890, fewer than 2700 bills 
were passed.  Id. at 240.  Walsh suggests that “[t]he volume was reduced because the new 
[1851] Constitution prohibited local and special legislation.  The change from special to 
general laws meant that a system that had been fragmented and piecemeal gave way to 
‘generalized’ policy based on universally applied rules.”  Id. 
62 See infra Part IV.A–D (examining the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent in adopting the 
proposed constitution and the lack of support for the rule among some delegates, 
respectively). 
63 H. FOWLER, 1 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE 
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 40 (1850) [hereinafter 1 DEBATES].  
The two propositions were introduced in the same resolution at the Convention, declaring 
“[t]hat special legislation shall be prohibited.  No act shall embrace more than one 
subject  . . . .”  Id.; see also infra Part IV.F (indicating that the purpose of the single subject rule 
was to prohibit the twin evils of private legislation and logrolling). 
64 1 DEBATES, supra note 63, at 40. 
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in the form of the single subject rule.65  Second, the single subject rule’s 
prohibition is absolute.66  In contrast to some of the rule’s iterations 
elsewhere, Indiana’s version was made applicable to all acts passed, and 
not simply to those that might be “special” or “local.”67 
It was in this environment—of displeasure with the results of 
excessive legislative discretion generally and of outright hostility toward 
special and local legislation and their enabling stratagem of logrolling—
that the delegates to the 1850 Indiana Constitutional Convention began 
their work.68 
IV.  THE 1850 CONVENTION AND 1851 RATIFICATION:  WINNERS, LOSERS, 
AND ORIGINAL INTENT 
We turn now to the question of what meaning the framers and ratifiers 
of the Indiana Constitution attached to Section 19.69  Constitutional 
interpretation in Indiana is a business similar to that of other states.  The 
Indiana Supreme Court recently explained: 
Interpreting our Constitution involves a search for the 
common understanding of both those who framed it and 
those who ratified it.  In construing the Indiana 
Constitution . . . [we] look to the language of the text in 
the context of the history surrounding its drafting and 
ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, 
and case law interpreting the specific provisions.  The 
actual language, however, is particularly valuable 
because it tells us how the voters who approved the 
Constitution understood it, whatever the expressed 
intent of the framers in debates or other clues.70 
Additionally: 
[W]e look to the history of the times, and examine the 
state of things existing when the [c]onstitution or any part 
                                                 
65 See infra Part IV.D (discussing those delegates opposed to the single subject provision).  
Indeed, several Constitutional Convention delegates opposed to the single subject rule 
argued that the rule would be superfluous. 
66 1 DEBATES, supra note 63, at 40. 
67 See infra Part VI (examining other states’ single subject rules). 
68 CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA, supra note 28, at 69 (noting the call for a 
constitutional convention to solve the issues that were in drastic need of amendment).  
69 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19. 
70 Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 519–20 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citations omitted). 
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thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, 
the mischief, and the remedy.  The language of each 
provision of the Constitution must be treated with 
particular deference, as though every word had been 
hammered into place.71 
Each of these sources will be considered.  Part IV.A begins by 
analyzing the intent of those delegates who favored the addition of the 
single subject provision.72  Next, Part IV.B considers the influence that 
other states had on the provision’s inclusion in the Indiana Constitution.73  
Part IV.C assesses how the rule’s language evolved during the 
Convention.74  Part IV.D describes the opposition’s viewpoints, while Part 
IV.E expresses the Ratifiers’ intent.75  Part IV.F describes the “dual prongs” 
of the single subject provision.76  Finally, Part IV.G considers the single 
subject rule in a constitutional context.77  Emerging from these sources is 
a clear and uniform intent to engineer a rigorously—and judicially—
enforced prohibition against logrolling and the joining of different 
subjects. 
A. The Winners’ Intent:  Delegates in Support 
Like most other provisions of the 1851 Constitution, the single subject 
rule did not command universal support amongst the delegates.  What the 
Convention majority said about Section 19 is the single most important 
key to accurately interpreting its meaning.78  Part IV.A.1 considers the 
                                                 
71 City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. S. Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ind. 2001). 
72 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the single subject rule’s introduction at the Convention, 
those who supported it, and the evolution of the rule’s language). 
73 See infra Part IV.B (providing others states’ influences on the Indiana Constitution). 
74 See infra Part IV.C (concerning the drafting and ratification of the language, the purpose 
and structure of the Constitution, and the language itself). 
75 See infra Part IV.D (reviewing the opposition’s arguments to the proposed single subject 
provision in the Indiana Constitution); infra Part IV.E (assessing the views of the ratifiers of 
the 1851 Constitution). 
76 See infra Part IV.F (explaining the “dual prongs” of the single subject rule). 
77 See infra Part IV.G (addressing the language itself).  The case law interpreting Section 
19 will be considered in a future Article. 
78 The Indiana Historical Society maintains a large collection of papers from William H. 
English, a distinguished Hoosier of the day and secretary to the 1850 Convention.  See 1 
DEBATES, supra note 63, at 89 (documenting English’s election as secretary).  
Contemporaneous historical resources reflect scant commentary on the single subject rule.  
See Indiana Historical Society, William Henry Smith Mem. Lib., William H. English 
Manuscript Collection (family papers, 1741–1928, specifically Box 1, Folders 8–11; Box 31, 
Folder 16; Box 61, Folder 3; Box 69, Folder 1; Box 71, Folder 4; Box 95, Folders 1–6).  The 
English Collection is likely the largest collection of Convention documents.  These papers do 
not appear to record any comments specifically concerning the single subject rule. 
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single subject rule’s introduction.79  Next, Part IV.A.2 analyzes the support 
that was given to the provision by its sponsor, Dr. Alexander C. 
Stevenson.80  Finally, Part IV.A.3 examines how the supporters of the 
single subject rule fought for its inclusion at the 1850 Convention.81 
1. The Single Subject Rule Introduced 
Charles Test, Indiana’s Secretary of State, was charged by the 
legislature to call the Convention to order, and he did so on the morning 
of Monday, October 7, 1850.82  Soon thereafter, one of Indiana’s most 
celebrated jurists, Judge Isaac Blackford of the Supreme Court, swore the 
delegates in.83  The Convention then proceeded to address basic 
organizational issues.84 
Two days later, on Wednesday, October 9, 1850, Gibson County’s 
Samuel Hall offered the first substantive resolutions of the Convention.85  
The ten October 9 resolutions are noteworthy for several reasons.86  Their 
cumulative character reflected the populist sentiment of the majority 
Democratic coalition.87  More particularly, all ten resolutions aimed to 
curtail the legislative branch by either limiting its discretion or removing its 
authority altogether.88  The framers’ intent was now displayed with 
resolute clarity:  to craft constitutional regulations—compulsory 
regulations—upon both the substance and the internal mechanics of the 
law-making process.89  Finally, the third October 9 resolution explicitly 
                                                 
79 See infra Part IV.A.1 (introducing the idea and concepts behind the single subject 
provision). 
80 See infra Part IV.A.2 (providing the background of Dr. Alexander C. Stevenson and the 
influence he had on the rule’s ultimate adoption). 
81 See infra Part IV.A.3 (reviewing the arguments posed at the 1850 Convention for the 
inclusion of the single subject provision). 
82 1 DEBATES, supra note 63, at 3.  
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 4. 
85 See id. at 22, 34 (citing numerous resolutions preceding these that addressed the 
business of the Convention, including the election of officers, selection of stenographers, and 
the creation of various committees). 
86 See id. at 40 (listing the ten resolutions).  The third resolution read as follows:   
That special legislation shall be prohibited.  No act shall embrace more than one 
subject—and that shall be expressed in the title.  Upon the final passage of 
every bill in either House, the “yeas” and “nays” shall be entered upon 
the journals, and no act of the General Assembly shall be in force until 
after its publication in print and distribution among the people. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
87 See supra Part III (addressing the historical context). 
88 1 DEBATES, supra note 63, at 40 (highlighting the ten resolutions from October 9, 1850).  
89 See id. at 40 (providing a summary of the proposed ten resolutions).  Even the 
resolutions that did not expressly mention the General Assembly aimed to reduce its 
discretion.  Id.  For example, the first resolution proposed to elect all judges, whereas under 
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juxtaposed the single subject rule with the prohibition against special 
legislation, reflecting society’s view of private legislation and logrolling as 
twin evils.90  Hoosier newspapers reported extensively on the Convention, 
a large number of which printed the October 9 resolutions verbatim, 
including the nascent version of the single subject rule.91  Hence, the rule 
made its public debut at the same time it was unveiled at the Convention. 
The origin of the October 9 resolutions is not apparent from the 
Debates.92  It is doubtful that Hall himself authored them, as many were 
included in the constitutions of other states.93  And because Hall’s 
involvement in promoting these ideas was extremely limited throughout 
the Convention, they were more likely the product of collaboration 
amongst like-minded delegates.  The burden of advancing each 
proposal—taking ownership for each and championing it, defining its 
purposes, and persuading other delegates to vote in its favor—fell to 
others.  One such like-minded delegate—at least on the principle of 
restraining the legislature—was, ironically, a member of the minority 
Whig party, a delegate from Putnam County, and a celebrated leader in 
his day—a man by the name of Alexander Stevenson.94 
2. Dr. Alexander C. Stevenson:  Sponsor and Spokesman 
Conceived as part of the third October 9 resolution, the single subject 
rule was not revived until the morning of December 11, 1850.95  Neither 
Samuel Hall nor any other delegate mentioned the single subject proposal 
between October 9 and December 11.  For a time it appeared as though the 
Convention had forgotten about the idea.  The delegates seemed 
                                                 
the 1816 Constitution, the judges were appointed by the governor and approved by the 
Senate; the presidents of the circuit courts were appointed by joint vote of the General 
Assembly.  Id.  The second resolution proposed to limit legislative discretion with respect to 
corporations and banks.  Id.  The seventh would limit the General Assembly’s appropriations 
authority, and the eighth, its authority to regulate the courts.  IND. CONST. of 1816, art. V, § 7. 
90 See 1 DEBATES, supra note 63 (introducing the special/local prohibition and single 
subject rule at the 1850 Convention to address the evils of logrolling and private legislation). 
91 See The Convention, GOSHEN DEMOCRAT (Ind.), Oct. 16, 1850 (“[N]o act shall embrace 
more than one subject”); Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, WEEKLY IND. STATE 
JOURNAL, Oct. 12, 1850 (reporting on the introduction of the single subject rule at the 
convention). 
92 1 DEBATES, supra note 63, at 40. 
93 See infra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing other state constitutions that 
contain a single subject provision). 
94 JESSE W. WEIK, WEIK’S HISTORY OF PUTNAM COUNTY INDIANA 696 (B.F. Bowen & Co., 
1910) (recounting Stevenson’s life). 
95 1 DEBATES, supra note 63, at 40; H. FOWLER, 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1078, 
1189–98 (Offset Process 1935) (1850) [hereinafter 2 DEBATES]. 
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preoccupied by other pressing matters of organic law, debating finances, 
education, and other controversial topics—that is, until Alexander 
Stevenson rescued this critical building block of the new constitutional 
order, to make it his own cause. 
Stevenson was arguably Indiana’s first bona-fide Renaissance man 
and rose to become a celebrated civil servant, “one of the most famous 
residents of Putnam County in the nineteenth century.”96  Born in 1802 in 
Kentucky, Stevenson trained to become a doctor at Transylvania 
University in Lexington.97  He relocated to Indiana in his twenties, settling 
ultimately in the town of Greencastle—the county seat of Putnam 
County.98  It was in Greencastle, and on a farm just outside of Greencastle, 
that Stevenson would spend the remainder of his life.99 
Although Stevenson “rose rapidly to eminence in his profession and 
as a surgeon was without a peer,” his interest in agriculture eventually 
overran his interest in medicine, and in 1843 he began focusing on 
agriculture full-time.100  Stevenson quickly became a leader in the field.101  
He wrote for a variety of agriculture periodicals and newspapers.102  He 
organized the Putnam County Agricultural Society.103  In 1847, Governor 
Whitcomb named Stevenson to the newly created State Board of 
Agriculture, and he served there for several years, including three as 
Board President.104  “[H]e was instrumental in creating the Indiana State 
Fair” in the 1850s.105 
Stevenson was also business-savvy.  Helping to organize one of 
Indiana’s earliest chambers of commerce, he was a director of the local 
Board of Trade, “designed to call the attention of outside capital to our 
natural advantages for manufacturing purposes.”106  Stevenson 
demonstrated an entrepreneurial inclination in his own business dealings 
as well.  At one point when he was unable to import English thoroughbred 
cattle into Indiana, Stevenson traveled to England and brought them back 
                                                 
96 JOHN J. BAUGHMAN, OUR PAST, THEIR PRESENT:  HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON PUTNAM 
COUNTY, INDIANA 61 (2008). 
97 WEIK, supra note 94, at 696–97. 
98 Id. at 697–98. 
99 Id. at 697. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 BAUGHMAN, supra note 96, at 61–62. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 WEIK, supra note 94, at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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himself.107  He was a leading voice in calling for the Indiana Shorthorn 
Breeders Convention to meet in Indianapolis in May 1872, and became its 
first president.108  He was also a leader in the American Shorthorn 
Convention, the National Swine-Breeders Convention, the Indiana 
Dairyman’s Association, and the State Wool-Growers Association.109 
In his spare time, Stevenson contributed to his community.  
Stevenson’s humanitarian impulses began with his well-known 
opposition to slavery—largely responsible for his decision to settle in 
Indiana—and while still practicing medicine, he cared for his parents’ 
elderly former slaves when they moved from Kentucky to Indiana.110  
Stevenson was also a fervent supporter of free public schools—he was 
“convinced . . . that [democratic] institutions were wholly dependent on 
morality, integrity[,] and intelligence.”111  Putting these interests into 
action, Stevenson was a founder of Indiana Asbury University in 
Greencastle—what is today DePauw University—and was named the first 
president of its Board of Trustees.112  Stevenson’s commitment extended 
to the Constitutional Convention, too, where he served on the education 
committee.113 
Politically, Stevenson became a Whig and “an advocate of the 
American system of [Henry] Clay.”114  His prominence in other fields 
enabled Stevenson to become a political leader.  He served in the Indiana 
House from 1831–32, the Indiana Senate from 1839–42, and again in the 
House from 1844–45. 115  During his last term, Stevenson was elected 
Speaker of the House.116 
                                                 
107 Id. at 699 (“he went to England, inspected the principal Short-horn herds of that 
kingdom and bought for himself a small herd of the best and brought them to Putnam 
county”). 
108 Id. 
109 BAUGHMAN, supra note 96, at 62; WEIK, supra note 94, at 699. 
110 See WEIK, supra note 94, at 200, 696 (stating Stevenson “was strongly opposed to slavery 
and the injustice of that institution made strong impressions on his mind, and he determined 
to seek a home in a land of free institutions, where to labor was honorable”). 
111 Id. at 698. 
112 BAUGHMAN, supra note 96, at 61. 
113 Id. 
114 WEIK, supra note 94, at 698. 
115 Id. 
116 Id.; BAUGHMAN, supra note 96, at 61.  Stevenson was also the Whig candidate for 
Lieutenant Governor of Indiana in several elections in the 1840s.  WEIK, supra note 94, at 698.  
Had the Whig party been stronger statewide, Stevenson almost assuredly would have been 
elected.  ESAREY, EXPLORATION TO 1850, supra note 48, at 475.  As was noted, however, the 
1840s saw the rise and eventual dominance of the Democrats.  See id. (noting the 
circumstances surrounding Stevenson’s 1844 election as Speaker); see also supra Part III 
(addressing the historical political context). 
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Stevenson’s political background is of considerable interest.  His 
comments at the 1850 Convention were informed by first-hand experience 
with the government as it existed under the 1816 Constitution.  Early in 
the Convention, in October 1850, Stevenson submitted several resolutions 
designed to reform the legislative branch—the branch that he had led—
by requiring a majority to pass a bill, and by mandating single-district 
elections.117  Stevenson’s resolutions, together with his Whig background 
and comments throughout the Convention, demonstrate an unwavering 
intent to limit the legislative branch under the new constitution by proscribing 
and regulating certain dimensions of its internal mechanics. 
Stevenson does not appear to have been a radical Whig, as his 
colleagues in the majority were receptive to his thinking.118  With his 
reputation of courtesy and thoughtfulness, experience as a leader in the 
existing legislature, and unwavering commitment to check future 
legislatures, Stevenson took up yet another cause of leadership—the 
single subject rule’s inclusion in the new Constitution.  He chose the 
morning of December 11, 1850, to make his move by proposing the single 
subject rule as an amendment to a provision on the introduction of bills in 
either chamber.119  While his purpose and strategy in advancing the single 
subject rule are considered below, it is noteworthy here that Stevenson 
was publicly credited with leadership surrounding the single subject 
rule.120  Thus, the Constitution’s ratifiers—the voters of Indiana—were 
aware that it was Stevenson who was responsible for the single subject 
rule.  The ratifiers undoubtedly appreciated his reputation as an advocate 
of legislative restrictions, as well as the significance of his sponsorship for 
the rule’s meaning. 
3. The Supporters Make Their Case at the Convention 
On the afternoon of December 11, 1850, the delegates, in the midst of 
deliberating various provisions on the legislature, resumed consideration 
of a previously introduced section: 
                                                 
117 See JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF INDIANA TO AMEND 
THE CONSTITUTION 64, 78 (Offset Process Indianapolis, 1936) (1851) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF 
THE CONVENTION] (showing the text of the resolutions); see also INDIANA, THE PIONEER ERA, 
supra note 33, at 414–15 (noting Stevenson’s opinion that “[o]ne of the greatest evils which 
had oppressed the State was too much legislation”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
118 See WEIK, supra note 94, at 201–02 (opining that while he does not appear to have been 
a war hawk during the antebellum period, Stevenson wrote a series of calm and lucid articles 
for the Putnam County Banner in opposition to secession). 
119 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1078, 1085. 
120 See EVANSVILLE DAILY J. (Ind.), Dec. 17, 1850 (“Mr. Stevenson moved to amend the next 
section so as to provide every bill shall embrace but one subject . . . ”); see also infra Part IV.A.3 
(describing the motion to amend and adopt the “one subject” rule). 
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Bills may originate in either House, but may be altered, 
amended, or rejected in the other; except that bills for 
raising the revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives.121 
The time had come for Stevenson to make his most lasting contribution to 
the Convention and to Indiana law, to make his move—literally.  “Mr. 
STEVENSON,” the Debates record stated, “moved to amend the section 
by adding the following:  ‘Every law shall embrace but one object, which 
shall be expressed in the title.’”122  Stevenson then explained his intent 
behind the amendment: 
The object of this amendment is to obviate a difficulty that 
frequently occurs in the Legislature.  When a bill is 
presented and its friends are not numerous enough to 
pass it, and they enter into a coalition with gentlemen 
who desire the passage of some other measure to 
mutually assist each other in the passage of both 
combined under one head; and it is intended to prevent 
another difficulty, which often arises when only a part of 
the character of the bill is expressed in the title.123 
Hence, the sponsor of this language stated two distinct purposes for its 
inclusion:  the prevention of logrolling, and the expression of a bill’s full 
character in its title.124  Significantly, Stevenson correlated each phrase in 
his amendment with each of its two purposes:  the title requirement was 
to prevent the difficulty arising from insufficient titles, whereas the single 
subject rule was intended to prevent logrolling.125  This was the intent of 
                                                 
121 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1078, 1084. 
122 Id. at 1085.  The requirement of expressing a bill’s subject in its title is known as the title 
requirement.  See supra note 1 (discussing the title requirement). 
123 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085. 
124 Id. 
125 See id. at 1086–87 (remarking Mr. Dobson, Mr. Owen, and Mr. Maguire); id. at 1114 
(quoting Mr. Gibson, “if a law would be unconstitutional, because all the subjects in it were 
not embraced in the title, it would also be void for another reason, that the body of the law 
embraced more than one subject . . . ”).  Still, even opponents of the single subject rule 
recognized that Section 19 would provide two discrete grounds for nullifying an act:  the title 
requirement, and the single subject requirement.  Id. at 1118–19.  Mr. Kilgore stated:  “if a 
law was passed embracing more than one subject, it would be . . . declared unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Court.”  Id.  Additionally, Mr. Pettit posed two questions that could be 
presented in a Section 19 challenge:  (1) whether the act contains more than one subject; and 
(2) if so, which, if any, was contemplated in the title.  2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1119–20; 
see also infra Part V.B (exploring the 1974 amendment).  Though both the single subject rule 
and the title requirement were adopted in the original version of the 1851 Constitution, a 
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the most definitive framer—the sponsor of what would become “Section 
19.”126  The goal of preventing logrolling would be furthered by a 
substantive limitation upon the contents of bills.127 
Stevenson was not alone in the meaning that he attached to his 
proposal.  The next speaker, James Borden, declared that: 
We have, sir, a precedent for such a provision.  I have in 
my hand the Constitution of California which contains 
this provision, ‘Every law shall contain but one subject, 
and that shall be expressed in the title.’  I suppose the object 
of it is to prevent the practice of log-rolling, as it has been 
termed by the Legislature.  I am satisfied that the correct 
course is to adopt the provision.  Almost every State 
Convention that has been called . . . has inserted a 
provision of this kind.128 
Other delegates offered similar praise for the section, some simply 
stating support, and others going further to refute the objections of 
opposing delegates.129  Thomas Smith, for example, responded to the 
concern that the single subject rule would make compromises difficult, 
since it is sometimes convenient as a political matter to group disparate 
subjects under the same bill.130  Smith replied that the Indiana General 
Assembly would remain at liberty to do what Congress had accomplished 
earlier that year in the Compromise of 1850—legislators could, when 
making deals, pass each side’s proposed legislation as separate bills.131  This 
would simultaneously ensure that separate subjects would each receive 
consideration as discrete, stand-alone acts, and would also enable the 
legislature to function in the context of practical political realities where 
deal-making is often necessary.  From the perspective of the legislature, of 
                                                 
1974 amendment to Section 19 removed the title requirement for reasons unrelated to the 
single subject rule.  IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19, amended Nov. 5, 1974; see also infra Parts 
V.B–C (discussing the legislature’s motive for the 1974 amendment). 
126 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19. 
127 See infra Part IV.F (exploring the single subject rule’s dual prongs). 
128 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085 (emphasis added); see also infra Part IV.B (exploring 
how the constitutions of other states influenced the delegates’ decision concerning the single 
subject rule).  The fact that Borden spoke next, and so definitively in favor of Stevenson’s 
amendment, is further evidence of Stevenson’s bipartisan appeal and of the widespread 
support that the single subject rule enjoyed among the delegates. 1 DEBATES, supra note 63, 
at 4–5.  It is likely that Borden was a member of the majority (Democrats’) coalition, as he 
formally nominated George Carr to be president of the Convention, who was then elected 
by acclamation.  Id. 
129 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085. 
130 Id. 
131 See id. at 1085, 1113 (including the remarks of both Mr. Smith and Mr. Stevenson). 
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course, this methodology would risk a gubernatorial veto of one act and 
not the other.  But the governor’s veto in Indiana is exceedingly weak 
because only a simple majority—the same majority required to pass a bill 
in the first place—is necessary to override a veto.132  Perhaps this concern 
contributed to the distillation of the governor’s veto in Indiana.  In any 
event, the option remains to pass disparate subjects in separate acts.  For 
Indiana’s framers, the rule’s theoretical inconvenience would not excuse 
the combination of multiple subjects in the same bill. 
James Ritchey similarly defended the single subject rule against its 
detractors, stating that no significant “difficulty” would result in 
practice.133  David Dobson and Daniel Read found appeal in the title 
requirement’s potential to help combat logrolling, while Samuel Hall—the 
delegate who originally submitted the single subject rule in the October 9 
resolutions—commented on the section’s role in the broader 
constitutional fabric.134  Two delegates in support offered examples from 
their experiences in the legislature, one of whom bluntly corroborated 
Stevenson’s assessment that the single subject rule “will, without doubt, 
prevent incongruous subjects being grouped together in the same bill.”135 
Following the debate over Stevenson’s amendment, “the yeas and 
nays were demanded.”136  Thomas Gibson—who voted against the single 
subject rule’s inclusion—asked to postpone the vote on grounds that it 
was “an important matter,” but this request was rejected and Stevenson’s 
amendment prevailed by a decisive 105-21 vote.137 
Alexander Stevenson had made his most significant contribution to 
the Indiana Constitution, and had done so with overwhelming support.  
                                                 
132 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. V, § 14. 
133 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085 (providing the remarks of Mr. Ritchey). 
134 See id. at 1086 (providing the remarks of Mr. Hall, Mr. Dobson, and Mr. Reed.); see also 
supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the introduction and importance of the October 9 resolutions); 
infra Part IV.F (discussing the single subject rule’s dual prongs to embody both a procedural 
prohibition against logrolling as well as a substantive restriction to prohibit acts from 
containing more than one subject). 
135 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1086–87 (quoting Mr. Owen and providing the remarks of 
Mr. Maguire).  Mr. Maguire, drawing on his legislative experience, discusses how Owen 
recounted a bill that was read only by its title, an appropriation to a certain county “and for 
other purposes.”  Id. at 1086.  Owen recounted that, when on its third reading a legislator 
asked what “other purposes” were involved, “it came out that the last section contained a 
provision divorcing a man from his wife.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Maguire 
similarly recounted a story in which a tremendous sum of money was appropriated for “a 
private and local purpose,” passing both chambers of the legislature “most probably without 
having been read through in either.”  Id.  Only Governor Noble’s vigilance discovered the 
offending provision and he vetoed the bill, which was passed again, this time without the 
appropriation.  Id.  
136 Id. at 1087. 
137 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1087. 
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While some of his fellow delegates in support of the provision focused 
their remarks on the title requirement, others focused on the virtue of the 
single subject rule itself.138  Nearly all commentators in support of the 
provision acknowledged its purpose of preventing logrolling and it was 
with this purpose in mind that the delegates, beginning with its sponsor, 
approved of the single subject rule.139 
B. A Study in Contrasts:  The Influence of Other States 
The first person to speak for Stevenson’s amendment, after Stevenson 
himself, was delegate James Borden.140  Borden specifically cited to the 
new California constitution, as well as to “[a]lmost every State Convention 
that has been called,” in support of the single subject rule’s inclusion in 
the new Indiana Constitution.141  Indiana’s delegates studied the debates 
and outcomes of other states’ conventions.142  Shortly after the start of the 
Indiana Convention, multiple copies of “[t]he Debates or Journals of the 
New York, Kentucky, and Wisconsin Conventions” were ordered “for the 
use of the members of this Convention.”143  Many delegates also 
referenced the constitutions and conventions of additional states beyond 
these three throughout the debates.144 
New York adopted a new constitution in 1846; Wisconsin, in 1848; and 
Kentucky, in 1850.145  Why copies of these states’ convention proceedings 
were selected, as opposed to others, is unresolved in the historical record.  
Wisconsin was a nearby northern state; Kentucky, a nearby southern state; 
and New York remained a political and economic leader among the states.  
All three states had adopted their constitutions recently, and all three had 
included some version of the single subject rule (and the title requirement) 
                                                 
138 See id. at 1085 (noting the remarks of Mr. Smith). 
139 See id. at 1085–87 (providing the remarks of Mr. Borden and his statement that “I 
suppose the object of [the single subject rule] is to prevent the practice of log-rolling”). 
140 Id. at 1085. 
141 Id.; see infra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the need for a single subject 
rule in Indiana, as other states that had recently held constitutional conventions had done). 
142 See, e.g., 1 DEBATES, supra note 63, at 17, 38, 54, 229, 293, 446, 583, 748, 1005 (providing 
references to Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio).  These states adopted single subject rules.  See 
OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. II, § 16 (“[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject”); MICH. 
CONST. of 1850, art. IV, § 20 (providing “no law shall embrace more than one object”); ILL. 
CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 23 (stating “no private or local law which may be passed by the 
generally assembly shall embrace more than one subject”). 
143 1 DEBATES, supra note 63, at 41. 
144 See supra note 142 and accompanying text (referencing Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan and 
their single subject rules). 
145 See KY. CONST. of 1850 (providing the new Kentucky Constitution); WIS. CONST. of 1848 
(providing the new Wisconsin Constitution); N.Y. CONST. of 1846 (providing the new 
Constitution of New York). 
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in their new constitutions.146  Regrettably, however, these states’ 
convention records reflect little of the thinking behind their respective 
single subject rules.147  Delegate Borden made reference to California’s 
new constitution, adopted in 1849, and while the language ultimately 
adopted by the Indiana Convention was similar to that of California’s, its 
convention also adopted the single subject rule without debate and with 
no clues as to the intent behind the provision.148 
Older versions of the single subject rule—the earliest of which, 
predating the American Revolution, was mandated by Queen Anne to her 
colony of New Jersey—are also mostly silent with respect to purpose or 
intent.149  It is telling that Indiana’s framers crafted their single subject rule 
                                                 
146 See KY. CONST. of 1850, art. II, § 37 (“No law, enacted by the General Assembly, shall 
embrace more than one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.”); WIS. CONST. of 1848, 
art. IV, § 18 (“No private or local bill, which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace 
more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. III, 
§ 16 (“No private or local bill, which may be passed by the legislature, shall embrace more 
than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.”). 
147 See R. SUTTON, REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE 
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 628 (A.G. Hodges & Co., 1849) 
(recording that the single subject rule was “read and adopted” without debate); JOURNAL OF 
THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 118, 606 (Tenney, 
Smith & Holt 1848) (providing the section was reported and read without debate);  WILLIAM 
G. BISHOP & WILLIAM H. ATTREE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1068 (1846) 
(noting three attempted amendments to the language, each of which was rejected without 
discussion, and the language’s subsequent adoption without debate). 
148 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085; see also CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. IV, § 25 (“Every law 
enacted by the legislature, shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the 
title; and no law shall be revised, or amended, by reference to its title; but in such case, the 
act revised, or section amended shall be re-enacted and published at length.”); J. ROSS 
BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA, ON THE FORMATION 
OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1849, 90 (1850) (discussing the 
California convention’s adoption of the single subject rule). 
149 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1844, 
xcviii (New Jersey Writers’ Project ed., 1942) (“For one provision in the new [1844] 
[C]onstitution the Convention reached back over the [C]onstitution of 1776 to Queen Anne’s 
Instructions to Lord Cornbury.  This is the provision that ‘every law shall embrace but one 
object and that shall be expressed in the title.’”); see also SAMUEL SMITH, THE HISTORY OF THE 
COLONY OF NOVA-CAESARIA, OR NEW-JERSEY: CONTAINING, AN ACCOUNT OF ITS FIRST 
SETTLEMENT, PROGRESSIVE IMPROVEMENTS, THE ORIGINAL AND PRESENT CONSTITUTION, AND 
OTHER EVENTS, TO THE YEAR 1721.  WITH SOME PARTICULARS SINCE; AND A SHORT VIEW OF ITS 
PRESENT STATE 236–37 (2d ed. 1877) (1765) (stating the original language from the Queen).  
The Queen wrote: 
You [Lord Cornbury] are also as much as possible to observe, in the 
passing of all laws, that whatever may be requisite upon each different 
matter, be accordingly provided for by a different law, without 
intermixing in one and the same act, such things as have no proper 
relation to each other; and you are especially to take care that no clause 
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consistent with three distinctive features of Queen Anne’s version.  First, 
the royal version distinguished its single subject requirement from its title 
requirement—while the two provisions were to work in tandem, they 
were severable, distinct provisions.150  The same approach would prove 
significant to Indiana’s single subject rule in the twentieth century, when 
its language was amended to remove the title requirement entirely.151  
Second, the Queen’s version did not limit its applicability to certain types 
of laws; instead, it was applicable to all laws passed by the colonial 
council.152  This is distinguishable from some states’ versions of the single 
subject rule in the 1840s and 1850s.153  Like Queen Anne’s original version, 
Indiana’s single subject rule was to apply globally, irrespective of the 
nature of the legislative act in question.154  Finally, the notion of “having 
no proper relation to each other” would be cited by one of the first Indiana 
Supreme Court cases to interpret the single subject rule.155 
One noteworthy contrast between these versions was their respective 
degrees of mandate.  Whereas the royal version applied “as much as 
possible,” Indiana’s single subject rule was clothed with the mandatory 
                                                 
or clauses be inserted in, or annexed to any act, which shall be foreign 
to what the title of such respective act imports. 
SMITH, supra, at 236–37. 
150 SMITH, supra note 149, at 236–37. 
151 See infra Part V.B (discussing the 1974 amendment in response to the decision in State 
ex rel. Pearcy v. Criminal Court of Marion Co., 274 N.E.2d 519, 521 (Ind. 1971), as the 
amendment eliminated the title requirement, created an exemption for codifications from 
the single subject rule, and retained the single subject rule, thereby simplifying the 
amendment). 
152 SMITH, supra note 149, at 236. 
153 See supra notes 142–44 (discussing the single subject rules of Wisconsin and New York 
which limited the single subject restriction to “private” or “local” legislative acts).  The 
Convention specifically rejected a proposal to limit Indiana’s single subject rule to private and 
local bills.  See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1121–23 (providing where the proposal was made 
and the results of the vote).  Indiana, of course, went further than rejecting the private or 
local limitation.  Id.  The framers included a prohibition of local or private bills where general 
laws could suffice and an absolute prohibition against special legislation in certain areas.  
IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 23.  Indiana’s single subject rule is applicable to all acts other 
than codifications that the General Assembly may pass.  Id. § 19.  Of the three other states’ 
journals kept by the Indiana Convention, only Kentucky’s shared the feature of global 
applicability, and like Indiana’s framers, those at the Kentucky Convention were particularly 
distrustful of legislative power.  See PENNY M. MILLER & AMANDA L. COOPER, 
Constitutionalism in Kentucky:  Adapting an Archaic Charter, in THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF 
AMERICAN STATES 189 (George E. Conner & Christopher W. Hammons, 2008) (providing a 
discussion on the Kentucky Convention and its distrust of legislative power). 
154 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19. 
155 See Madison & Indianapolis R.R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217, 245–46 (1856) (quoting 
the Convention’s Address to the Electors, which explained that “[t]wo provisions having no 
proper connection with each other, may, under the present [1816] [C]onstitution, be 
embraced in the same bill, and be carried by a combination of their respective friends”). 
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verbiage of “shall.”156  Unlike the royal version, Indiana’s single subject 
rule was intended to be literal and non-negotiable, affording no 
discretion—no authority at all with respect to logrolling. 
Some states have found that their single subject rules were intended 
for purposes other than, or in addition to, the prevention of logrolling.157  
Most of these states’ conventions, however, were silent as to purpose, 
simply including the single subject mandate without any elaboration.158  
By demonstrating what Indiana’s framers did not intend, we come to 
appreciate the depth of the framers’ commitment to the purpose that was 
stated at the 1850 Convention.159  In sum, Indiana’s single subject rule was 
intended to preclude logrolling, to apply to all legislative acts, and to 
apply always—not simply when convenient or “as much as possible.”160  
In contrast to Queen Anne’s version, the Indiana framers allowed for no 
discretion with respect to the single subject requirement.161  The framers’ 
message of restraint to future Indiana legislatures was clear.162 
C. Changes in Convention:  From Introduction to Final Product 
Four noteworthy alterations were made to the single subject rule 
between its introduction and final engrossment at the Convention.163  
These concerned the use of the term “subject,” a provision limiting the 
portion of a bill to be voided in the event of a single subject violation, a 
provision allowing for properly connected matters, and endowing the 
                                                 
156 Compare SMITH, supra note 149, with IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19 (“An act . . . shall 
be confined to one subject and matters properly connected therewith.”) (emphasis added). 
157 See, e.g., JACK STARK, THE WISCONSIN STATE CONSTITUTION:  A REFERENCE GUIDE 95 (G. 
Alan Tarr ed., 1997) (“This section’s purposes are to encourage the legislature to devote its 
time to matters that affect the entire state, to preclude favoritism and discrimination, and to 
alert the members of the legislature to the subject matter of the legislation that they consider.” 
(citation omitted)); see also infra Part VI (examining the evolution of Section 19’s language 
over time, and discussing how the single subject rule retains the original intent of the 
framers). 
158 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (examining other states’ conventions which 
addressed the single subject rule). 
159 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085–88 (introducing the idea of the single subject rule 
and the discussion surrounding its ratification and approval). 
160 See IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19 (providing the specific language of the provision); 
2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085 (stating the thoughts of Mr. Borden, who indicated that the 
purpose was to prevent logrolling).  
161 See IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19 (reading the language as unambiguously limiting 
acts to one subject only). 
162 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1114 (providing the remarks of Mr. Stevenson).  
Stevenson even went so far as to explicitly state that the Convention was not adopting the 
single subject rule simply because other states had done so.  Id.  Rather, Indiana had its own 
compelling reasons for including the rule.  Id. 
163 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19; 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085–87, 1118; JOURNAL OF 
THE CONVENTION, supra note 118, at 942. 
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single subject rule with its own section in the new constitution.164  All of 
these issues played a role in creating the single subject rule which was 
eventually adopted into the Indiana Constitution.165 
Part IV.C.1 analyzes the discussions between the delegates for 
choosing between “object” and “subject.”166  Next, Part IV.C.2 examines 
the proposed amendment by Mr. Dunn that would void an entire act if it 
violated the single subject provision.167  Finally, Part IV.C.3 addresses the 
“properly connected” phrase.168 
1. “Subject” versus “Object” 
Immediately before the Convention’s first vote on the single subject 
rule, Thomas Gibson moved to replace the word “object” with the word 
“subject.”169  Another delegate “presume[d] the gentleman from Putnam, 
[Mr. Stevenson], will accept the proposed amendment as a 
modification.”170  Stevenson having no objection, “[t]he question was 
taken on the amendment to the amendment, and it was agreed to” without 
a recorded vote.171  The language of the rule was thus modified from its 
original form, “[e]very law shall embrace but one object” to “[e]very law 
shall embrace but one subject.”172 
No discussion was had on the rationale for this change.  Gibson 
declared only that “it makes a very material difference.  I will venture to 
say if the word ‘object’ be retained, there will not be a law passed within 
a dozen years, that will be constitutional.”173  Gibson did not explain why 
he believed the difference between the terms was meaningful, nor did any 
other delegate comment on his proposal.  Several possible explanations 
account for Gibson’s change.  First, most delegates were already using the 
two terms interchangeably, with most preferring “subject.”174  While this 
explains why Stevenson and his majority were inclined to accept the 
                                                 
164 See IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19 (providing the final version of the single subject 
rule); 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085–87, 1118 (discussing Mr. Bright’s, Mr. Gibson’s, and 
Mr. Dunn’s proposals during the Convention); JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 118, 
at 942 (giving the original version of the single subject rule). 
165 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19. 
166 See infra Part III.C.1 (providing the reasoning for the delegates’ decision to choose one 
word over the other). 
167 See infra Part III.C.2 (reviewing Mr. Dunn’s proposed amendment). 
168 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1115; see infra Part III.C.3 (expanding on the discussion 
which ensued between the delegates over the phrasing). 
169 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1087. 
170 Id. 
171 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19; 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1087. 
172 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1087. 
173 Id. 
174 See id. at 1085–87 (providing the principal single subject rule discussion). 
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change without a roll call and without discussion—there would be no 
legal impact in the change, as logrolling would be prohibited using either 
term—it does not explain why Gibson felt the change so important. 175 
A second explanation is that Gibson read the term “object” to 
comprehend a unique dimension that would raise unintended problems 
for future legislatures.  As of 1850, “object” could, for example, refer to 
“[t]hat about which any power or faculty is employed, or something 
apprehended or presented to the mind by sensation or imagination.”176  
Read thusly, Gibson might have feared that any single “item” within a bill 
would be deemed a separate “object” by the courts, thereby precluding 
the combination of legitimately related items under one heading.  This, for 
example, would make the passage of a single appropriations bill 
impossible because each appropriation representing a separate “object” 
would be in violation of the single “object” prohibition.  Alternatively, 
Gibson may have read “object” to refer to “purpose or intent.”177  In this 
case, a single, cogent legislative intent would have to be expressed in 
every title of every act—a very difficult mandate, if not impossible, as both 
a political and etymological matter.  A “purpose,” too, could be phrased 
misleadingly, contravening Stevenson’s rationale for a title 
requirement.178  In either sense of the word, Gibson may have found an 
insurmountable hurdle to the legislature’s business, one beyond simply 
the suppression of logrolling. 
                                                 
175 See JAMES RAWSON, A DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMICAL TERMS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
195 (Lindsay & Blackston eds., 1850) (listing “object” as a synonym of “subject”).  At least 
one American authority of the day explicitly equated the terms “subject” and “object.”  Id.; 
see also, e.g., Carl H. Manson, The Drafting of Statute Titles, 10 IND. L.J. 155, 157–58 n.4 (1934) 
(providing examples of how other commentators have noted the general equivalence of the 
two phrases during this time in the context of single subject limitations across varying 
jurisdictions); accord WILLIAM CARPENTER, A COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 
SYNONYMES 158 (Thomas Tegg ed., 3d ed. 1842).  At least some delegates to the Kentucky 
Convention did the same.  See SUTTON, supra note 147, at 128 (noting section four of the 
legislative committee minority report, which proposed that “[n]o law passed by the 
legislature shall embrace more than one distinct object, or subject matter, which shall be 
expressed in the title.”). 
176 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 564 (1846). 
177 Id. (defining “object” in a second sense as “[t]hat to which the mind is directed for 
accomplishment or attainment; end; ultimate purpose”).  Plainly, this sense of the word was 
common in Indiana at the time of the Convention.  2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085 
(emphasis added) (explaining the “purpose” of his single subject proposal, Stevenson 
himself stated that “[t]he object of this amendment is to obviate a difficulty that frequently 
occurs in the Legislature.”) 
178 See supra text accompanying note 125 (discussing the two main purposes of Section 19 
as proposed at the Convention—to prevent logrolling and problems arising from insufficient 
titles, and how the proposed amendment embodied these purposes). 
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A third possibility is that the influence of other states motivated 
Gibson’s change.179  For example, Michigan’s 1848 Convention rejected 
combining the terms “object” and “subject” out of concern that the 
amalgam would preclude future codifications of the statutory law.180  
Neither Gibson nor any other delegate expressed a concern about 
codification during the Convention; it would not rise to the level of 
constitutional concern in Indiana until the 1960s.181 
Gibson’s imported phrase, “subject,” was defined by the leading 
authority of the day in a roundabout manner—“[t]hat on which any 
mental operation is performed; that which is treated or handled . . . [t]hat 
in which any thing inheres or exists.”182  Other conventions understood 
the term similarly.  As one delegate to Michigan’s convention put it, “[t]he 
subject is the thing treated of; the object is the motive.”183  Another 
delegate remarked: 
“Object,” means the thing struck at—aimed at—the thing 
hit.  “Subject,” means the thing controlled—brought 
under—embraced.  The subject is one thing, the object 
another.  Object embraces the motive and design, and 
oftentimes both the promoters and makers of laws have a 
very different object from what the title would propose.184 
While a majority of the Indiana delegates thus believed that both terms 
would be effective barriers to logrolling, it can also be said that the 
majority must not have opposed the unique connotations then inherent in 
the term “subject.”185  Indiana’s single subject rule thus prohibits both the 
                                                 
179 See infra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing Michigan’s 1848 convention). 
180 See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION TO REVISE THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 148 (1850) [hereinafter MICHIGAN DEBATES] 
(noting the amendment of Mr. Bagg and the remarks of Mr. Crary particularly). 
181 See infra Part V.B (discussing the two concerns that led to the 1960 amendment of Section 
19, which were the need for an exception to the single subject rule for codifications and an 
effort to simplify the title requirement). 
182 WEBSTER, supra note 176, at 803; accord JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, A UNIVERSAL AND 
CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 705 (Wilkins, Carter, and Co., 1850) (“that 
on which any operation, either mental or material, is performed”); ALEXANDER REID, A 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 395 (D. Appleton & Co., 1814) (“that on which any 
operation is performed; that concerning which something is affirmed or denied”); CHARLES 
RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 766 (William Pickering, 
London, 2d ed. 1844) (“any thing put or placed under, sc. view of the mind, act of the body”). 
183 See MICHIGAN DEBATES, supra note 180, at 148 (noting the remarks of Mr. Bush). 
184 Id. (quoting the remarks of Mr. Williams). 
185 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1087 (demonstrating that the amendment was adopted 
by a majority vote). 
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procedure of logrolling and the substantive combination of two or more 
“subjects.”186 
2. Limitation of Voided Portion 
Immediately following the vote to accept Stevenson’s amendment, 
William Dunn—a delegate who had voted against the single subject rule—
moved to amend it “by providing that if any subject is embraced in a law, 
and not expressed in the title, the law shall only be void so far as such 
provision is concerned.”187  As it stood before the Dunn amendment, the 
rule’s language necessitated the voiding of an entire act if it contained 
more than one subject.188  There would be no basis for the judiciary to void 
one portion of the law while preserving and upholding the validity of 
another part of the same act.189  With Dunn’s amendment an additional 
constitutional test emerged.190  Now, in addition to the question of 
whether the act contained more than one subject, the courts were obliged 
to determine which portion of the act was void—a question resolved by 
deciding which subjects went unexpressed in the title of the act.191 
Dunn’s reason for his amendment was simple—he feared that without 
this language the opponents of a given bill would heap amendments upon 
it, deliberately diversifying the subjects contained in the act, and inviting 
the courts to find the entire act void.192  By adding this security measure, 
a legislative majority could designate the true subject.  Whatever subject 
was expressed in the title of the act would be shielded from constitutional 
infirmity, at least under Section 19.193  Dunn’s amendment was 
approved,194 and the single subject rule assumed the next phase of its 
evolution: 
Bills may originate in either House, but may be altered[,] 
amended, or rejected in the other except that bills for 
                                                 
186 See infra Part IV.F (exploring the single subject rule’s dual prongs). 
187 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1087. 
188 Id. 
189 See infra Part V.B (stating that the effect of this early version of the rule was restored in 
1974, when the title requirement was removed altogether from Section 19’s language).  
Today, Indiana courts face an “all or nothing” proposition—either the entire act in question 
is void, or none of it is void. 
190 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1087. 
191 See id. at 2009 (noting the remarks of Mr. Pettit, who acknowledged that the courts 
would be confronted by at least two legal questions:  “first, as to whether a bill contains two 
subjects, and secondly, whether these subjects are expressed in the title of the bill”). 
192 Id. at 1087. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 1087, 1114 (discussing Stevenson’s remarks and noting that Stevenson was 
unenthusiastic about Dunn’s amendment, but nevertheless “thought it could do no harm”). 
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raising revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives.  Every law shall embrace but one 
subject, which shall be expressed in the title:  [p]rovided, 
[t]hat if any subject should be embraced in a law, which 
is not expressed in the title, such law shall only be void as 
to so much thereof as is not expressed in the title.195 
By providing this “guidance” to the courts, the framers had once more 
affirmed their intent that the single subject rule would receive vigorous 
judicial enforcement. 
3. The “Matters Properly Connected” Phrase 
Another major struggle over the single subject rule took place in the 
days following its December 11 introduction.196  On December 12, Michael 
Bright, a leader of the opposition to the single subject rule and chairman 
of the Committee on the Legislative Department, moved that the 
provision—then part of Section 17—be referred to his legislative 
committee, where Stevenson’s language would be stricken from the 
Section.197  A dialogue ensued between the supporters and detractors of 
Stevenson’s language.198  Delegate John Niles proposed to amend the 
evolving instructions to the legislative committee thusly—“[e]very law 
shall embrace but one subject, and matters reasonably connected 
therewith . . . .”199 
Mr. Nave proposed the additional phrase as a “compromise.”200  This 
compromise would allow for intimately connected items to be included 
under the rubric of a single subject while Mr. Niles suggested “exclud[ing] 
all matters which might be entirely foreign or irrelevant to the main 
subject of the bill.”201  Mr. Niles made clear that his proposed addition was 
intended to soften the title requirement and to discourage litigation over 
titles—to clarify that a perfect title was not demanded under the rule’s 
                                                 
195 See JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 934, 936 (discussing Article XII, 
section 17, as referred to the committee on revision, arrangement, and phraseology and 
reported on Friday, February 7, 1851). 
196 See id. at 413–14 (providing the remarks of Mr. Stevenson, who introduced the rule). 
197 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1113; see JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 118, at 
428, 475 (noting that Bright was chairman of the committee). 
198 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1113–16 (referencing a dialogue between Mr. Clark, Mr. 
Stevenson, Mr. Bright, Mr. Gibson, Mr. Niles, and Mr. Newman over Mr. Stevenson’s offered 
amendment). 
199 Id. at 1115 (emphasis added). 
200 See id. at 1117 (providing the remarks of Mr. Nave). 
201 See id. at 1115 (quoting the remarks of Mr. Niles). 
Evans and Bannister: The Meaning and Purposes of State Constitutional Single Subject R
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
116 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
language.202  Niles’ motion to amend the instructions by adding the new 
phrase was adopted by the legislative committee.203  It appeared as though 
Niles’ proposal was going to carry the day. 
However, it was then debated whether to re-commit the section to the 
legislative committee with Niles’ instructions.204  Niles’ instructions 
would not prevail because some supporters of Stevenson’s language 
feared that future courts would employ the “properly connected” phrase 
to eviscerate the clear intent of the Convention that acts be limited to one 
subject and that the single subject rule be judicially enforced.205  It was also 
noted that the courts would not arbitrarily decide title requirement 
questions without reference to the body of the act.206  Other “compromise” 
delegates favored Niles’ amendment insofar as they believed it would 
discourage the courts from frequently voiding laws for mere technical 
defects in the titles while at the same time preserving the integrity of the single 
subject rule.207  The Convention approved an amendment to the 
instructions providing that all laws be plainly worded, and the delegates 
                                                 
202 Id.  Mr. Niles also declared: 
I apprehend that it would not be either necessary or prudent to require 
that a perfect epitome of a bill should be included in the title.  With such 
a provision as [Stevenson’s], it would certainly require the careful 
examination of a good lawyer in nine cases out of ten, to say what law 
is constitutional and what is not constitutional. . . . [W]ith the provision 
[under Stevenson’s language], I ask whether, if the Legislature should 
err in judgment in this matter, such error would not open the door to 
endless litigation? 
Id. (emphasis added). 
203 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1116. 
204 Id. 
205 See id. (reviewing the remarks of Mr. Dobson and contending that Niles’ amendment 
would attenuate Stevenson’s language).  Mr. Smith stated that, “I do not know how our 
courts would construe the words ‘reasonably connected therewith,’ but I presume that they 
would, in most instances, decide that whatever the Legislature had done, was ‘reasonable.’”  
Id.  Further, Mr. Kelso bluntly remarked that Niles’ language was offered to allow the very 
thing the Convention was called to prevent—passing amalgamated but unrelated provisions 
under one act.  Id. at 1116–17.  Smith in particular was remarkably clairvoyant—the extent to 
which his apprehension came true will be discussed at length in a future Article. 
206 See id. at 1116 (quoting the remarks of Mr. Smith, “I do think that the idea . . . that our 
courts will determine our laws to be unconstitutional in consequence of the title being 
defective, and not clearly pointing out the body of the bill, is all ‘gammon’ . . . .”).  Smith was 
correct.  Courts over time developed and used a “title-body” analysis for title requirement 
questions.  See Oddi, supra note 1, at 16–17 (discussing several court opinions and the 
holdings that discuss the importance of consulting the body of the act in question). 
207 See, e.g., 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1116 (referencing the remarks of Mr. Owen which 
endorse Niles’ amendment).   Mr. Owen noted that he had “heard no reply made to the 
argument of [Stevenson], that it is a thing in itself injurious that two or more subjects having 
no connection with each other, should be embraced in the same bill, or that one bill having 
merit should be made to carry another one on its back having no merit”). 
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then voted on whether to recommit the section with the instructions as 
amended.208  A majority, including Stevenson, voted against recommitting 
the section, and thereby rejected the amended instructions as well.209 
The Convention adjourned and on the next day, December 13, Niles 
immediately moved to again send the instructions to the legislative 
committee to provide for his “properly connected” phrase.210  On this 
occasion, he described his proposed amendment as allowing matters 
“naturally and reasonably connected” with the subject of an act.211  Niles 
again appeared to intend for his “properly connected” phrase to curtail 
litigation arising out of the title requirement, and again affirmed his 
support for the single subject requirement, noting that he was “opposed 
to all omnibuses in legislation.”212  Curiously, the Convention again voted 
to amend the instructions per Niles’ proposed language and approved the 
re-committal of the existing language of the section to the legislative 
committee, but thereupon promptly killed the instructions, including Niles’ 
language, by laying the proposed amended instructions upon the table.213  
The result was that the section, including Stevenson’s language but 
excluding Niles’ proposed phrase, was referred to the legislative 
committee without any instructions whatsoever.214 
The fact that the Convention twice rejected Niles’ instructions 
suggests that a majority of delegates—the same majority expressing a 
clear intent that the single subject rule would enjoy judicial enforcement—
was persuaded by the reasoning of those opposed to the “reasonably 
connected” phrase.  The majority still intended that Section 19 would be 
vigorously enforced by the judiciary and worried that future courts might 
read the “reasonably connected” phrase as an invitation to eviscerate their 
intent.215  Hence, Stevenson’s version of Section 19 was sent to the 
                                                 
208 See id. at 1117 (reviewing the remarks of Mr. Morrison whose language was ultimately 
incorporated into the Constitution as Article 4, Section 20); IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 20 
(providing the text of Indiana Constitution). 
209 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1119. 
210 Id. at 1121; accord JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 430. 
211 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1121 (addressing the remarks of Mr. Niles). 
212 See id. at 1122 (reviewing the remarks of Mr. Niles, who also suggested that the people 
“may safely presume that the Legislature will carry out the spirit of the section in good faith,” 
thereby implying that the courts would not need to enforce it); infra Part IV.D.5 (noting that 
by the end of the Convention, on the last occasion that Section 19 was considered, supporters 
and opponents of the section alike still understood and intended that Section 19 would 
receive vigorous enforcement from the courts). 
213 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1122–23.  It was Mr. Pettit who “move[d] to lay all the 
instructions on the table.”  Id. at 1123 (emphasis added). 
214 Id. at 1123–24. 
215 Justin W. Evans & Mark C. Bannister, Reanimating the States’ Single Subject Jurisprudence: 
A New Constitutional Test, forthcoming 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (explaining that 
this anxiety proved to be well-founded). 
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Committee on Revision, the last step to inclusion in the new 
Constitution.216  And then a remarkable thing happened. 
The Committee on Revision reported Section 19 containing the phrase, 
altered slightly from “reasonably connected” to “properly connected.”217  
The opponents of Section 19 had lost at every turn throughout the 
Convention, and undoubtedly realized they could not strike the Section 
altogether.  Had Section 19’s opponents managed to accomplish the next 
best thing in the Committee on Revision—adding the phrase 
notwithstanding the majority’s earlier rejection of it, in the hopes their 
ideological allies on future courts would use it to eviscerate Section 19?218  
While committee records from the Convention do not appear to have been 
preserved, the circumstantial evidence suggests that this is exactly what 
happened. 
The Committee on Revision, Arrangement and Phraseology had a 
membership of twenty-one delegates.219  The single subject rule’s most 
dire and outspoken opponents—Michael Bright, John Pettit, and Thomas 
Walpole—were members of this committee, as were six other delegates 
who had cast at least one vote against the rule.220  The following table 
summarizes how each of the revision committee’s members voted on the 
single subject rule throughout the Convention:221 
  
                                                 
216 See JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 936 (providing that each law shall 
address solely one subject). 
217 See id. at 942 (“Every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected 
therewith . . . ”). 
218 See, e.g., ESAREY, EXPLORATION TO 1922, supra note 53, at 519 (discussing many 
commentators who disliked partisan judicial elections and quoting, “critics [of the 1851 
Constitution] rightly insist that the judiciary was weakened and a vast field opened for 
sinister partisan politics.”). 
219 See JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 54 (listing the twenty-one members 
as following:  “Owen, Bright, Morrison of Marion, Read of Clark, Pettit, Kent, Borden, 
Newman, Rariden, Graham of Warrick, Smith of Ripley, Hamilton, Read of Monroe, Hall, 
Kilgore, Pepper of Ohio, Morrison of Washington, Ritchey, Wallace, Dobson, and Walpole.”). 
220 Id.; see infra Table 1 (detailing the three votes that took place). 
221 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1087, 2010–11 (summarizing the delegates who 
participated in the three votes and how each voted); JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra 
note 117, at 54 (listing all of the committee members). 
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Table 1 
Member of 
Revision Committee 
First vote 
(to include) 
Second 
vote 
(to strike) 
Third vote 
(to include) 
Owen YES [No vote] [No vote] 
Bright NO YES NO 
Morrison of Marion NO YES NO 
Read of Clark YES NO YES 
Pettit YES YES NO 
Kent [No vote] [No vote] YES 
Borden YES [No vote] [No vote] 
Rariden YES YES NO 
Graham of Warrick NO YES YES 
Smith of Ripley YES NO YES 
Newman NO [No vote] [No vote] 
Hamilton YES NO YES 
Read of Monroe YES [No vote] [No vote] 
Hall YES NO YES 
Kilgore [No vote] [No vote] [No vote] 
Pepper of Ohio YES NO [No vote] 
Morrison of Washington [No vote] YES NO 
Ritchey YES [No vote] [No vote] 
Wallace YES [No vote] [No vote] 
Dobson YES NO YES 
Walpole NO YES NO 
 
As Table 1 reveals, Section 19’s opponents nearly had a majority, nine 
of the twenty-one members, and when combined with those who had 
voted only once, opponents and nominal supporters numbered fifteen.222  
Only five of the revision committee’s members had consistently favored 
the single subject rule throughout the Convention.223  The revision 
committee made its report near the end of the Convention on February 7, 
1851—as a practical matter, too late to change by renewing debate.224  
Opponents of the single subject rule had taken one last swing at its defeat, 
not at the Convention where a majority of delegates favored the rule and 
opposed the “properly connected” language, but by the future Indiana 
courts that would interpret and develop Section 19.  A large majority of 
                                                 
222 See supra Table 1 (listing Section 19’s opponents). 
223 See supra Table 1 (supporting the rule consistently were:  Read of Clark, Smith of Ripley, 
Hamilton, Hall, and Dobson).   
224 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2033. 
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the delegates opposed inclusion of the phrase and accepted it only at the 
end of the Convention when the choice was between acceptance of the 
revised version and rejection of the Section altogether.225 
For several reasons, the “matters properly connected” phrase should 
not be read to “undo” the single subject requirement.226  First, even if a 
majority of the delegates had supported inclusion of the phrase, the 
majority’s intent with respect to the single subject mandate was uniform: 
they intended that the provision would actually function to limit acts to 
one subject and that the courts would enforce this requirement with 
vigor.227  This intent cannot be ignored, nor is it outweighed by the 
“properly connected” phrase in light of the respective intentions and votes 
for Section 19 and the “matters” phrase.228  Second, the final version of 
Section 19, even after its alterations in the revision committee, still 
contained the proviso that acts would “be void only as to so much thereof 
as shall not be expressed in the title.”229  Hence, even after the Revision 
Committee, Section 19 contemplated that a portion of an act could be 
voided.  It would necessarily fall to the courts to perform this analysis and, 
when necessary, the voiding function.230 
Third, the Address to the Electors, written after the Revision 
Committee’s alterations, continued the position that Section 19 was 
designed to prevent logrolling by a substantive prohibition forbidding 
two or more subjects in the same act.231  Fourth, the supporters of the 
“properly connected” phrase expressed an intent that the phrase’s impact 
would be limited to the title requirement.232  According to Niles, the phrase 
would be beneficial insofar as it would discourage excessive litigation 
over the titles of acts.233  It would communicate to the courts that the title 
requirement could not be read in a technical fashion to defeat acts that 
were otherwise sound, including acts that were otherwise sound by virtue of 
                                                 
225 See id. at 2066, 2069 (noting that Section 19 made it into the final version of the new 1851 
Constitution). 
226 Id. at 2069. 
227 See infra Part IV.D–G (noting the uniform acknowledgment among the rule’s 
convention supporters and detractors that the rule would be judicially enforced if it was 
included in the new Constitution). 
228 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2069. 
229 Id. 
230 See infra Part IV.D (discussing the fact that even the rule’s opponents acknowledged 
that the rule would be judicially enforced). 
231 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2043 (indicating that the rule is calculated to prevent 
logrolling); see also infra Part IV.E (discussing the intent and the decision making process of 
the ratifiers). 
232 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2069. 
233 Id. at 1115. 
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compliance with the single subject requirement.234  Fifth, to read Section 19 as 
“requiring all acts to be limited to one subject and permitting more than one 
subject” produces an internally inconsistent, logically invalid statement.235  
                                                 
234 See supra notes 202, 205, 212 and accompanying text (reiterating the views and 
comments made by Mr. Niles concerning the title requirement). 
235 See ALEXANDER MILLER, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 1–22 (2d ed. 2007) (providing an 
excellent overview of symbolic logic and its power to describe linguistic meaning).  Let the 
phrase, “shall embrace but one subject” be expressed symbolically as P and the phrase 
“matters properly connected therewith” be expressed as Q.  2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2069; 
MILLER, supra, at 2–3.  “Act,” as in the type of legislative act contemplated by Section 19, will 
be denoted as x.  2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2069; MILLER, supra, at 2–3.  Hence, the first 
portion of Section 19 can be expressed as: 
∀(x) (Px & Qx), 
meaning that, “for all legislative acts, an act shall embrace but one subject and matters 
properly connected therewith.”  MILLER, supra, at 5–6.  We can further designate a constant 
R meaning “additional subjects,” or “some number of multiple subjects in excess of one.”  Id. 
at 3.  Because we defined P in terms of “one and only one subject,” R can be restated as “not 
‘but one subject,’” and rewritten symbolically as “not P,” or –P.  Id. at 3–4.  Now, if we take 
the phrase “matters properly connected therewith” to mean “other subjects,” or “additional 
subjects,” then R = Q and the two terms are interchangeable.  Id. at 6–7.  Hence, when we 
substitute R for Q, our expression becomes: 
∀(x) (Px & Rx), 
and, substituting –P for R, we get: 
∀(x) (Px & –Px), 
meaning that “for all acts, an act shall be confined to one subject and also need not be 
confined to one subject.”  Id.  Thus, if the phrase “matters properly connected therewith” is 
understood to contemplate “matters which are in themselves discrete subjects,” then Section 
19 is, logically, a contradiction.  See STAN BATONETT, LOGIC 147–49 (2008) (discussing 
contradictions).  Whatever “matters properly connected” are understood to be, therefore, 
they cannot be additional subjects.  Id. at 148.  To hold otherwise is to interpret Section 19 in 
such a way that it is reduced to a contradiction—a logical fallacy.  Even if this was the intent 
of the opponents of Section 19, their intent should not prevail for the reasons discussed above, 
and for the additional reason that engrafting this type of contradictory meaning upon a 
provision in the Constitution has long been expressly forbidden by our rules of interpretation.  See, 
e.g., May v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546, 555 (1883) (discussing the significance of the meanings of words 
when interpreting constitutions).  The court states: 
In the interpretation of constitutions, as well as statutes, the object is to 
ascertain and carry out the purpose of the authors.  In doing this, the 
words used in the instrument should be taken in their literal 
signification, unless . . . it is made to lead to possible oppression or 
injustice, or to contradictions or absurd results. 
Id. (emphasis added); Decatur TP. v. Board of Comm’rs of Marion County, 39 N.E.2d 479, 
483 (Ind. Ct. App. 1942) (discussing the purpose and intent of constructing statutes).  The 
court states: 
It has often been stated by the courts, that in the construction of statutes 
[and, by way of May v. Rice, constitutions as well] the prime object is to 
ascertain and carry out the purpose and intent of the [L]egislature; that 
to do this the words should first be considered in their literal and 
ordinary signification; that if, by giving them such a signification, the 
meaning of the whole instrument is rendered doubtful, or is made to lead 
to contradictions, or absurd results, the intent, as collected from the whole 
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Finally, reading Section 19 in a contrary manner renders the entire 
provision pointless.  Had the framers intended to permit multiple subjects 
in an act, no provision whatsoever would have been necessary, for 
multiple-subject acts had prevailed in the absence of an affirmative 
restriction under the 1816 Constitution.  The “matters properly 
connected” are logically best understood to comprise a subset of the single 
subject to which an act must be confined.236 
Section 19’s “matters properly connected” phrase represents the 
majority framers’ attenuated acceptance of the notion that the courts 
would avoid nullifying acts based upon technical defects in their titles.237  
It was not the intent of the framers to craft a rule limiting acts to one 
subject, while simultaneously permitting multitudes of subjects.  In light 
of the title requirement’s removal from Section 19 in 1974, it is doubtful 
how much of a practical difference the phrase makes, or should make, 
upon single subject analysis in Indiana today.238  The “matters properly 
connected” phrase must be understood with the framers’ intent in mind.  
Acts today should not be voided on mere technicalities, but must 
nevertheless still be confined to one subject.239  A “matter properly 
connected” to the subject is therefore one: 
(1) which might fall outside the scope of the act’s subject, 
if the said subject is defined unreasonably narrowly; and 
(2) which has a natural and reasonably justifiable 
connection to the subject such that the matter is, 
conceptually and logically, a subset of the subject 
(with the understanding that a given provision is not 
automatically said to have a natural or reasonable 
connection to the subject merely because the 
legislature has included it in the act at issue); and 
(3) whose presence in the act does not represent an 
additional discrete subject when the subject of the act, 
                                                 
instrument, must prevail over the literal import of terms, and control the strict 
letter of the law. 
Decatur, 39 N.E.2d at 483 (emphasis added).  Contradictions are per se “absurd,” as they are, 
by definition, never logically valid.   BATONETT, supra, at 147-49. 
236 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2069. 
237 Id. 
238 See IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19, amended Nov. 5, 1974 (“An act, except an act for the 
codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject and matters 
properly connected therewith.”).  
239 See IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19, amended Nov. 5, 1974 (noting the “matters properly 
connected” phrase is still included within the text). 
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however characterized, is defined with reasonable 
breadth. 
The Revision Committee removed the single subject provision from 
the language to which it had originally been amended.240  This gesture 
acknowledged the importance of the single subject rule, which was now 
complete and stood as it would go to the voters for approval: 
Sec. 19.  Every act shall embrace but one subject and 
matters properly connected therewith; which subject 
shall be expressed in the title.  But if any subject shall be 
embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the 
title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as 
shall not be expressed in the title.241 
It is through this detailed history that we are able to better understand the 
evolution of the single subject rule that is still in force in Indiana today, 
and the rule’s intended constitutional function. 
D. The Minority’s Intent:  Delegates Opposed 
The remarks of the single subject rule’s opponents are noteworthy for 
the simple reason that these delegates’ concerns were considered and 
rejected by the Convention.242  As a result, the opposition’s remarks can 
help to guide our analysis by clarifying or eliminating some otherwise 
speculative parameters.  It is constitutionally axiomatic that the minority’s 
objections should not govern the common law interpretation of Section 
19—since these delegates lost, their intent should not prevail.  Section 19’s 
Convention opponents were extremely vocal and active in their 
opposition.243  The following five major lines of opposition merit 
                                                 
240 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2069. 
241 Id.; accord JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 942. 
242 See supra Part IV.C (discussing the failed attempts by Mr. Niles to prevent the single 
subject rule’s inclusion in the draft constitution). 
243 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1113 (introducing Mr. Niles’ motion “to strike out the 
additions which had been made to the section by the Convention, and to report it back as it 
was originally reported”); JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 166–70 (“general 
subjects, and also the various resolution submissions . . . to be incorporated into the new 
Constitution”).  In light of Bright’s chairmanship of the legislative committee and his 
opposition to Section 19, it is unsurprising that the first draft of the committee’s legislative 
article contained no single subject rule.  2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1113; JOURNAL OF THE 
CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 166–70.  The Convention refused Bright’s motion to 
recommit Section 19, which was part of Section 17 at the time, to his committee so that he 
could strike it out of the draft Constitution.  2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1113. 
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attention.244  Part IV.D.1 considers the view of critics that the single subject 
provision was unnecessary.245  Next, Part IV.D.2 examines the notion that 
a regularly-enforced single subject rule would hinder the legislature’s 
function.246  Then, Part IV.D.3 considers the idea that critics believed the 
single subject provision would invariably require the courts to assess the 
compliance of acts with the rule.247  Part IV.D.4 explains some critics’ 
feeling that the single subject provision would not be workable in 
practice.248  Finally, Part IV.D.5 concludes by considering the opposition’s 
final attempt to exclude the single subject provision from the 1850 Indiana 
Constitution.249 
1. The Single Subject Rule: Unnecessary and Superfluous 
The first major objection to the single subject rule coalesced around 
the notion that it was unnecessary.  Requiring a majority to pass a bill, 
every vote to be recorded in the journals, and every bill to be read entirely 
through on three separate days would, according to the rule’s detractors, 
make legislators fully aware of a bill’s contents.250  These provisions, 
                                                 
244 See infra Part IV.D.1–5 (discussing the five lines of opposition). 
245 See infra Part IV.D.1 (introducing the idea that the single subject provision is 
unnecessary and superfluous). 
246 See infra Part IV.D.2 (reviewing the arguments of critics for the why the single subject 
provision would burden the legislature). 
247 See infra Part IV.D.3 (expressing the view that the rule would add an additional layer of 
checks and balances to the government). 
248 See infra Part IV.D.4 (analyzing the oppositions’ views that the single subject provision 
is not feasible in real life scenarios). 
249 See infra Part IV.D.5 (providing the oppositions’ final attempt at the Convention to keep 
the single subject provision out of the Constitution). 
250 See generally IND. CONST. of 1816, art. III (noting that the 1816 Article III was entirely 
silent as to the requirement of a majority to pass a bill).  Each of these represented a 
constitutional innovation in Indiana, as the 1816 Constitution contained none of them.  Id.  
Section 17 simply stipulated that “every bill having passed both houses, shall be signed by 
the president and speaker of their respective houses.” Id. § 17.  Section 9 declared that “[t]he 
yeas and nays of the members, on any question, shall, at the request of any two of them, be 
entered on the journals.” Id. at § 9 (stating otherwise, the recording of votes was not 
mandatory, but was done only if two or more members specifically requested that they be 
taken down).  Section 17 also established that “[e]very bill shall be read on three different 
days in each house, unless in case of urgency, two-thirds of the house, when such bill may 
be depending, shall deem it expedient to dispense with this rule.” Id. § 17.  Accordingly, 
under the 1816 Constitution, “the rules might be suspended and a bill taken through all 
readings in both houses on the same day, by merely repeating the title, and then might pass 
by a bare majority of a quorum, and without the ayes and nays.”  WALSH, supra note 61, at 
179 (discussing these safeguards are all, in some form, included in the 1851 Constitution); see 
IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, §§ 18–25 (requiring majority to pass a bill and requiring the yeas 
and nays on passage of every bill or joint resolution, and requiring every bill to be read by 
title on three days while prohibiting suspension of the rule for the third reading). 
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opponents contended, rendered the single subject rule a valueless 
redundancy checking an efficient legislative process as opposed to 
legislative abuse.  As one delegate put it, “I am satisfied that there [are] 
already sufficient [provisions] in the Constitution to protect the people 
from unjust legislation, and if those provisions are not amply sufficient to 
protect the people against legislative imposition, then to pass [Section 19] 
would only make the matter worse.”251 
The majority’s rejection of these concerns is revealing.  First, while the 
other provisions alluded to might effectively advertise a bill’s contents, 
the preclusion of legislator deception was only one of Section 19’s 
purposes.  One of the two primary purposes for the single subject 
language was the prevention of logrolling.252  The majority felt that the 
Constitution’s other provisions would not effectively prevent logrolling, 
and that logrolling was a sufficiently pressing problem that it demanded 
a provision of its own.253 
The single subject rule, moreover, was part of a larger puzzle.  Reform 
of the legislative branch was the primary motivation for the Convention 
to begin with.254  The ratifiers and their delegates sought to check not only 
the substance of legislative acts, but also the legislature’s internal 
mechanics—the procedural dimension of lawmaking.  The single subject 
rule was one gear in the engine of legislative reform.255  The rule’s 
inclusion would not by itself reform all aspects of the old legislative 
scheme, but it would play a vital role toward that end. 
                                                 
251 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085–86, 1119–20, 2009 (quoting the remarks of Bright, 
Pettit, and Read). 
252 Id. at 1085. 
253 See generally City of S. Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 685–86 & n.4 (Ind. 2003) (holding 
that the Article 4, Section 23 prohibition against special legislation was intended to prevent 
logrolling); see also Frank Sullivan Jr., “What I’ve Learned About Judging,” 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 
195, 208–11 (2013) (providing a discussion of the Kimsey case).  Kimsey did not rely upon 
evidence from the Convention in concluding that Section 23 was intended to prohibit 
logrolling.  Id.  Inferring such an intent is reasonable since the special or local prohibition and 
the single subject provision appeared for the first time at the Convention as sister provisions.  
See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing that the two propositions were introduced in the same 
resolution at the Convention).  Even if the Section 23 prohibition against special and local 
laws was also intended to prevent logrolling, Section 19 was nevertheless still included in 
the new Constitution.  IND. CONST. OF 1851, art. IV § 19.  This illustrates the great intensity 
with which the framers intended to prohibit logrolling—an unsurprising conclusion since 
the entire purpose of the Convention was to restrain the legislative authority.  See supra Parts 
II–III (noting the origin and extensive history of the formation of the single subject rule in 
Indiana). 
254 See supra Part III (reviewing the historical conditions surrounding Indiana’s single 
subject rule in 1850). 
255 See supra Parts II–III (discussing the historical impetus for limiting the legislature 
through a variety of means). 
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2. The Single Subject Rule: Roadblock to an Effective Legislature 
Several delegates objected to the single subject rule on the grounds it 
would frustrate the legislature—one delegate even went so far as to 
declare that “the operation of such a provision will be to embarrass the 
Legislature exceedingly.”256  Opposition delegates predicted the rule 
would simply create needless problems.  The anticipated hardships 
included:  (1) the difficulty of reducing a subject to summary form for the 
title;257 (2) the misguided goal of preventing variety within an act;258 (3) 
the incentive to circumvent the title requirement by duplicating the text of 
the act in the title itself;259 (4) the inability of the legislature to craft 
enduring rights under the rule;260 and (5) the inevitable litigation that 
would result from such a provision.261  The majority, however, remained 
unfazed.  Notwithstanding these concerns, the single subject rule would 
be included. 
Significantly, the majority’s adoption of the single subject rule 
reflected a rejection of the underlying argument against it, that “many 
subjects are sometimes necessarily embraced in one object.”262  These, of 
course, were attacks against the core purpose of the single subject rule.  
Neither the procedure of logrolling nor its byproduct—bills containing 
multiple subjects—would be permissible under the new order. 
Some opponents did not appreciate that Stevenson’s language was 
offered for reasons beyond informing legislators of the contents of acts.263  
One opponent’s remarks are illustrative: 
It may be convenient and proper sometimes to embrace 
two or more objects or subjects in the same bill.  There can 
be no objection to doing so if the title shall be so worded 
as to set forth all the purposes of the bill.  The intention of 
[Mr. Stevenson], no doubt, is to prevent the insertion of a 
provision not at all indicated by the title of the bill.  The 
intention of the gentleman, no doubt, [is a good 
                                                 
256 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085 (quoting the remarks of Mr. Chapman). 
257 See id. (referencing the remarks of Mr. Chapman). 
258 See id. (referencing the remarks of Mr. Clark). 
259 See id. at 1087 (reviewing the remarks of Mr. Morrison). 
260 See id. at 2009 (noting the remarks of Mr. Pettit who argued that the legislature would 
inevitably violate the single subject rule, undermining any rights it created by statute). 
261 See id. at 2008–09 (quoting the remarks of Mr. Spann who contended that legislation 
arising from the single subject rule would be “endless and vexatious”). 
262 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085 (quoting Mr. Bright) (emphasis added).  Mr. Clark 
also declared that, “[T]here must be a variety of things embraced in a bill . . . .”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
263 Id. at 1085–87. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2015], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss1/10
2014] Indiana’s Single Subject Rule 127 
one], . . . and I think should be carried out; but that can be 
done without circumscribing the Legislature so that they 
shall be compelled to embrace but a single object in a bill.  
If deception be prevented, that is all that the gentleman has in 
contemplation, and I should think that might be 
accomplished by requiring that the objects or subjects of 
a bill shall be clearly defined in the title.264 
As Stevenson had made clear to the Convention, and as the framers as a 
whole would communicate to the ratifiers, Section 19 advanced multiple 
goals.265  While other provisions throughout the new constitution would 
assist Stevenson’s title requirement with the prevention of legislator 
ignorance, the framers were concerned that without Section 19, logrolling 
would not be effectively curtailed.266  The majority’s resolve in the face of 
these objections reinforces the degree to which they were committed to 
preventing logrolling and the fact that they viewed logrolling as an evil in 
itself.267  Those opposed pointed out that the rule would probably make 
for a more cumbersome legislative process—yet Stevenson’s rule was 
adopted anyway.268 
3. The Single Subject Rule:  Necessitating Judicial Involvement 
Several opponents were concerned that the single subject rule would 
craft a misguided check in the governmental distribution of powers and 
opposed judicial involvement with the rule’s enforcement.  This is 
perhaps the most substantial objection to the single subject rule because 
the framers’ reply likely has the most profound and immediate 
application to contemporary single subject jurisprudence. 
This line of opposition began when Michael Bright paused during his 
remarks to ask, “[w]ho is to decide whether a law embraces two or more 
objects?”269  A member from the audience replied, “[t]he courts will 
decide.”270  Mr. Bright protested vigorously, encouraging the Convention 
to “[l]eave it to the Legislature to embrace as many subjects or objects as 
                                                 
264 See id. at 1087 (quoting the remarks of Mr. Maguire) (emphasis added). 
265 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19; see infra Part IV.F (outlining the single subject rule’s 
dual prongs). 
266 See supra Part IV.D.1 (discussing the single subject rule as unnecessary and 
superfluous). 
267 See supra Part IV.D.2 (assessing the argument that the single subject rule would be a 
roadblock to an effective legislature). 
268 See supra Part IV.A.2 (noting Stevenson’s leadership in securing the rule’s approval).  
269 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1086 (quoting the remarks of Mr. Bright). 
270 See id. (quoting the remarks of a Member). 
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they please.”271  Other delegates echoed objections to the involvement of 
the courts.272  One asked: 
Will it [the single subject rule] not entail a curse upon the 
country in lieu of a blessing?  It will be a question for the 
courts to determine whether more than one subject is 
included in any one act, and if more than one, it will be 
unconstitutional, and therefore a nullity.273 
Another delegate “was of the opinion . . . that this was a matter which 
should be left entirely to the Legislature; that the Legislature should 
decide what the law was, and not leave it to be ‘indicated’ by judges on 
the bench.”274 
Hence, all of the delegates, including those opposed to the single subject 
rule, agreed that if the rule was included, the duty of enforcing it would 
fall to the courts—to analyze questions arising under this provision, as 
with every other provision of the new constitution.275  No delegate spoke 
a word to contradict this basic constitutional fact:  it would fall to the 
courts to enforce the single subject rule.276  Single subject questions, in 
other words, were to be a “judicial” question, resolved by the courts in the 
exercise of their “judicial function” as the branch of government settling 
questions of constitutionality. 
To the extent the single subject rule might have offended the 
traditional view of the distribution of powers (which, we have seen, it did 
not), Indiana’s framers rewrote the rules.  It would be a judicial duty to 
nullify laws passed in breach of the single subject rule, even though the rule 
touched upon the legislature’s internal procedural operations.  The framers were 
not making the judiciary a superior branch.  Rather, all branches of the 
government would be defined by an authority higher than any of them:  
the framers and ratifiers themselves. 
                                                 
271 See id. (quoting the remarks of Mr. Bright). 
272 See id. 1086–87 (noting the remarks of Mr. Bright, Mr. Dobson, Mr. Maguire, Mr. Nave, 
Mr. Read, and Mr. Morrison). 
273 See id. at 1087 (quoting the remarks of Mr. Nave).  
274 See id. at 2008 (quoting the remarks of Mr. Walpole). 
275 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1086. 
276 Id.; see supra Part IV.D.3 (discussing judicial enforcement).  See generally Randy E. 
Barnett, The Judicial Duty to Scrutinize Legislation, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 903, 913 (2014) 
(expanding on the ideas of individual popular sovereignty, presumed consent, and judicial 
engagement). 
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4. The Single Subject Rule:  Unworkable in Practice 
A few delegates opposed to the single subject rule asserted that the 
rule would be unworkable in practice.277  The rule, so they argued, would 
inevitably be “[i]ndefinite and equivocal, and such as . . . could never be 
effectually carried out.  And, indeed, such was the character of the whole 
article.  People would differ about the title, differ about every little thing 
contained in a bill or law . . . .”278  By incorporating the single subject rule, 
the majority rejected this claim and expressed an intent that the single 
subject rule would not only “function” in practice, but would be enforced 
in practice as well.279  Unfortunately, the rule’s broadly-worded language 
gave its opponents the opportunity to defeat the Convention’s intent by 
inviting future interpretations that would render the rule a nullity in 
practice.280 
5. The Opposition’s Last Gasp (at the Convention, Anyway)  
The delegates called a vote on the rule’s third reading on February 4, 
1851.281  This represented the minority’s final opportunity to prevent the 
                                                 
277 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1087 (suggesting that the title requirement could be 
circumvented by copying the text of the act into the title).  Further, Mr. Chapman stated, “I 
think it will lead to much practical difficulty.”  Id. at 1085. 
278 See id. at 2008 (quoting the remarks of Mr. Spann).  Similar objections were raised over 
time in the common law, but tests of reasonableness do not render the law “indefinite” and 
“equivocal.”  Evans & Bannister, supra note 215. 
279 See Hendricks v. State, 196 N.E.2d 66, 70 (Ind. 1964) (discussing precepts of 
constitutional interpretation).  Our common law starts with the presumption that this is so: 
One of the fundamental rules of constitutional construction is that no 
word shall be assumed to be mere surplusage.  It is an essential corollary 
that every word must be given a meaning if possible . . . , “[t]he 
authorities agree that the words used in the Constitution must be 
presumed to have been carefully chosen so that each word would have 
a meaning.  It has been said that each word must be thought of as having 
been deliberately selected and intentionally placed as though it had 
been hammered into the instrument . . . .”  We may assume that the drafters 
of the Constitution of 1851 meant what they said. 
Id. (quoting Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville, 24 N.E.2d 937, 942 (Ind. 1940)) (emphasis 
added).  The history of Section 19 and the impetus for its adoption show that this is true of 
the single subject rule in particular.  See supra Parts III–IV (reviewing the origin of Indiana’s 
single subject rule, the 1850 convention, and its 1851 ratification); see also 2 DEBATES, supra 
note 95, at 2010 (explaining that logrolling was a real-world problem requiring a real-world 
solution). 
280 Evans & Bannister, supra note 215. 
281 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2001, 2011; see also Ind. Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Sch. 
Comm’rs, of the City of Indianapolis, 679 N.E.2d 933, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing 
that, in this respect, the rule’s Convention opponents have prevailed to a greater degree than 
have its supporters in the modern jurisprudence).  The decisional law interpreting Section 
19 has rendered the single subject rule a veritable nullity.  Evans & Bannister, supra note 215. 
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rule’s inclusion in the new Constitution.  And try they did.  Various 
attacks were lodged against Stevenson’s language, most of which were 
echoes of earlier objections.282  After listening to the opposition’s 
comments, the rule’s champion, Alexander Stevenson, rose to make his 
final remarks on the section he had proposed.283  In reply to a motion to 
strike his language entirely, Stevenson said: 
If that motion prevails it will strike out a principle which 
I look upon as being of the greatest importance—one 
which has been regarded of so much importance as to be 
incorporated in the new Constitutions of several of the 
States.  Now, I have seen the power that a few individuals 
have in passing bills that are worthless and injurious, by 
tacking them upon other bills, even upon revenue bills.  
This is an evil which should be remedied.  We are here to 
reform it—and we ought to reform it.  Gentleman say that 
this provision will result in injury.  For my part, I cannot 
see what injury is likely to result from it.  In my mind they 
are all imaginary.284 
Stevenson’s closing remarks reinforce what we have already 
observed.  Logrolling, the “passing [of] bills . . . by tacking them upon 
other bills[,]” was the “mischief to be remedied” by the single subject 
rule.285  It was of fundamental importance not just to the Convention, but 
to the voters who authorized the Convention.286  Accordingly, the single 
subject rule was intended to be enforced—to be a “reform,” as Stevenson 
would put it, which had practical, real-world value.287 
The motion to strike the rule was defeated by a vote of seventy-eight 
opposed to forty-two in support, and it was engrossed for a third reading 
by a vote of seventy-eight to thirty-one.288  The single subject rule had won 
                                                 
282 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2008–10 (debating alternative wordings at the 
Convention). 
283 Id. at 2010 (referencing the remarks of Mr. Stevenson). 
284 Id. (quoting the remarks made by Mr. Stevenson). 
285 See Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 844 N.E.2d 481, 484 (Ind. 2006) (“In 
construing the constitution, we look to the history of the times, and examine the state of 
things existing when the [C]onstitution or any part thereof was framed and adopted, to 
ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy.” (emphasis added)); see also City Chapel 
Evangelical Free Inc. v. S. Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ind. 2001) (noting that the time in 
history surrounding the time period of the framers and amenders must be examined in 
relation to the text).  
286 See supra Part III (examining the origin of Indiana’s single subject rule); see also infra Part 
IV.E (considering the ratifiers and what the framers told them). 
287 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2010. 
288 Id. at 2010–11. 
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its place in the draft of the new Constitution.  Its fate would now fall to 
the ratifiers of the Indiana Constitution—the voters. 
E. The Ratifiers and What the Framers Told Them 
Interpreting a provision of the Indiana Constitution is not exclusively 
a matter of the framers’ intent, though that intent is “paramount.”289  We 
must also seek out the intent of the ratifiers, those Indiana citizens who 
voted to adopt the proposed Constitution.  This is sometimes stated as 
seeking “the common understanding of both those who framed [the 
Constitution] and those who ratified it.”290  On occasion, as was the case 
in Bonner v. Daniels, the Indiana Supreme Court has adopted a 
constitutional interpretation based strictly on the language of the 
provision in question, on the grounds that “[t]he actual language . . . is 
particularly valuable because it ‘tells us how the voters who approved the 
Constitution understood it, whatever the expressed intent of the framers 
in debates or other clues.’”291  Although appropriate there, where no direct 
evidence of original intent existed on the particular question at issue, the 
Bonner approach is unnecessary—and, indeed, is undesirable—with 
respect to Section 19.  First, Bonner’s approach is a rare exception to the 
conventional method of constitutional interpretation.  Most authorities 
rely upon a variety of factors to interpret a given provision, and those that 
focus heavily or exclusively upon just one factor focus upon the framers’ 
intent, since that intent is “paramount.”292  In the case of Section 19, there 
is overwhelming (even uniform) evidence of a clear intent on the part of 
the framers.293  Second, the single subject rule is distinguishable on 
multiple important grounds from provisions of the type under 
                                                 
289 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (stating that the meaning of a constitutional 
provision must be derived from the intent of the framers). 
290 E.g., Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 484 (quoting McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 986 (Ind. 
2000)); Embry v. O’Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind. 2003) (quoting City Chapel Evangelical 
Free Inc., 744 N.E.2d at 447). 
291 907 N.E.2d 516, 519–20 (2009).  In Bonner, neither the Debates nor any other indicia of 
the framers’ intent was cited in support of the interpretation adopted there.  See id. at 520–
22.  The plaintiffs in Bonner claimed that the education clause, found in Section 1 of Article 8, 
requires the legislature to provide an education of a particular quality, but the Court rejected 
this claim.  Id. 
292 See id. at 519–20 (explaining that the history surrounding the drafting and ratification 
must be reviewed in conjunction with the text); supra note 5 (stating that the meaning of a 
Constitutional provision must be derived from the intent of the framers); see also City Chapel 
Evangelical Free Inc., 744 N.E.2d at 447 (noting that the time period of the framers and ratifiers 
must be examined in relation to the text). 
293 See supra Parts III–IV (examining the origins of Indiana’s single subject rule). 
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consideration in Bonner.294  Finally, choosing between the ratifiers’ intent 
and the framers’ intent is unnecessary with respect to Section 19 because 
we have a clear “common understanding” among the framers and ratifiers 
of the single subject rule.295 
Our next step, then, is to examine what the ratifiers’ intent was.  The 
plain language of Section 19 dictated not a procedural prohibition against 
logrolling directly, but rather a substantive prohibition upon legislation 
generally:  namely, no act could contain more than one subject.296  Hence, 
the voter who simply read Section 19, without any other context or 
external influence, would attach an intent to Section 19 that the substance 
of legislation be regulated in such a manner as to preclude multiple 
subjects under one act.297  This remains true today even after Section 19’s 
amendments.298  In addition to the plain language of the single subject 
rule, the ratifiers had another resource with which to evaluate and 
interpret their new Constitution.299  This influence was widely circulated 
and undoubtedly shaped the meaning they would attach to Section 19.300  
Immediately before adjournment, the framers announced a “voters’ 
                                                 
294 Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 522.  First, the language under consideration in Bonner reflected 
no specific intent on the part of the framers to require an educational system of any particular 
quality.  Id.  This is in stark contrast to the single subject rule, for which the framers 
manifested a clear and incontrovertible intent that logrolling be prohibited and that the 
courts enforce the prohibition.  Second, Bonner noted that the first of the two duties imposed 
by the education clause was “general and aspirational” and not “concrete,” such that it was 
not judicially cognizable.  Id. at 520.  This Article has demonstrated the framers’ intent that 
the single subject rule would be not only mandatory and enforceable, but also actually 
enforced by the courts in practice.  The single subject rule cannot be read, either on its face or 
in light of the framers’ intent, to be merely aspirational.  See generally supra Part IV.D.3 
(analyzing the single subject rule as necessitating judicial involvement); supra Part IV.D.4 
(discussing the single subject rule as unworkable in practice); supra Part IV.D.5 (analyzing 
the opposition’s final objections to the rule); supra notes 149, 156 and accompanying text 
(comparing the royal version of the single subject rule with the Indiana Constitution, art. IV, 
§ 19); supra note 162 (discussing Mr. Stevenson’s remarks); supra note 175 (noting the 
meanings of the terms “subject” and “object” during that period).  Finally, unlike the 
language in Bonner, the single subject rule is not an issue of first impression.  See, e.g., Jackson 
v. Indiana ex rel. S. Bend Motor Bus Co., 142 N.E. 423, 424 (Ind. 1924) (noting that precedents 
exist in which acts were nullified as violations of the single subject rule). 
295 See supra Part IV.E (exploring the ratifiers’ intent). 
296 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19. 
297 See infra Part IV.F (noting that the framers, too, intended to achieve a prohibition against 
logrolling by a substantive regulation upon the contents of bills). 
298 See infra Part V (concluding that the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent continues to govern 
the meaning of Section 19, notwithstanding its linguistic evolution over time). 
299 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1086, 2042 (discussing the requirement that statutory 
language “be expressed in plain and simple” terms). 
300 Id. at 2042 (introducing the Address to the Electors, which was to “embody[] a brief 
statement of the changes proposed in the amended Constitution”). 
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guide” to the new Constitution.301  Entitled “Address to the Electors,” this 
document explained the changes that the new Constitution would make 
to the existing state government.302  The single subject rule was explained 
as follows: 
No law is to embrace more than one subject and matters 
properly connected therewith; and the subject is to be 
expressed in the title.  The tendency of this rule is, to prevent 
what is familiarly termed ‘log-rolling.’  Two provisions 
having no proper connection with each other, may, under 
the present [1816] Constitution, be embraced in the same 
bill, and be carried by a combination of their respective 
friends, though neither, in itself, has merit or strength to 
obtain the vote of a majority, and would fail, as it ought, if 
voted upon singly.303 
This is extremely valuable as a matter of constitutional construction.  First, 
in light of its prolific verbatim publication in newspapers of the day, it is 
highly unlikely that the ratifiers would have been unaware of the framers’ 
purpose for the single subject rule.304  The Address helps us to conclude 
with a greater degree of confidence what this Article has already 
intimated:  the framers and ratifiers understood the single subject rule in 
the same way. 
The Address also reaffirms what was implied in the Debates—the title 
requirement was intended to prevent legislator deception or ignorance as 
to a bill’s contents, while the single subject rule was intended to prevent 
logrolling and multi-subject acts.305  This correlation between Section 19’s 
two requirements, title and subject, and the two intents, deception or 
ignorance and logrolling or multi-subject acts, is important today.  This 
distinction is important in Indiana because the language of Section 19 has 
been amended since the Convention.306  The framer’s intent concerning 
titles is no longer a part of the Constitution since the title requirement was 
                                                 
301 Id. (“[A]ddress to the electors of the State, explanatory of the provisions of the new 
Constitution,” a guide intended to aid in securing its adoption.). 
302 Id. at 2042–46. 
303 Id. at 2043 (emphasis added). 
304 See, e.g., Address to the Electors, IND. ST. J., Mar. 12, 1851, at 1–2 [hereinafter Address] 
(reciting the Address verbatim). 
305 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19. 
306 See infra Part VI (discussing the single subject rule in other states).  This distinction is 
important in other single subject jurisdictions since these other states, with the exception of 
Illinois, also contain the title requirement.  Confusing the discrete purposes of the single 
subject rule and the title requirement will result in an unclear framework for evaluating 
single subject challenges in the courts. 
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removed in 1974.307  What remains is the single subject rule and the intent 
motivating its adoption.  The goals of preventing logrolling and multi-
subject acts retain the vitality of original intent even today.308 
Reading the single subject rule based strictly on the language, without 
reference to contemporaneous indicia of original intent, leads to the same 
result.  “[C]onstitutional declarations, regardless of the subject-matter, are 
imperative on legislative action unless they obviously and unmistakably 
appear to be merely directory.”309  The controlling term selected by the 
framers—“[a]n act . . . shall be confined to one subject”—was not in 1850, 
nor is it now, “merely directory.”310  The framers understood that “[i]n the 
second and third persons, shall implies a promise, command or 
determination.”311  The framers did not intend to make a recommendation 
or to provide guidance through the single subject rule.  It was to be a rule, 
a requirement—a command.  The language itself prohibits reading the single 
subject rule as a mere aspiration.  Accomplishing such an interpretation 
by appeal to a more remote principle, such as the separation of powers 
doctrine, is irreconcilable with original intent and reads into the 
Constitution a conflict between these principles that does not exist.312 
F. The Single Subject Rule’s Dual Prongs 
The framers intended the single subject rule to prohibit logrolling and 
intended that this procedural prohibition would be accomplished through 
a substantive restriction upon the contents of bills.313  Likewise, we have 
seen that the ratifiers understood the substantive requirement as a 
function of Section 19’s plain language.314  By virtue of the Address to the 
Electors and the newspaper coverage of the day, the ratifiers undoubtedly 
understood that Section 19 also embraces a procedural bar against 
logrolling.315 
Section 19’s framers and ratifiers shared a common understanding:  
the single subject rule embodies both a procedural prohibition against 
logrolling, as well as a substantive restriction forbidding any act from 
                                                 
307 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19, amended Nov. 5, 1974. 
308 See infra Part V.C (concluding that the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent continues to govern 
the meaning of Section 19, notwithstanding its linguistic evolution over time). 
309 Powell v. State, 139 N.E. 670, 670 (Ind. 1923) (emphasis added). 
310 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19. 
311 WEBSTER, supra note 176, at 747 (emphasis partly removed). 
312 Evans & Bannister, supra note 215. 
313 See supra Part IV.F (exploring the single subject rule’s dual prongs). 
314 See generally supra Part IV.C (analyzing the plain language of Section 19). 
315 See generally Part IV.E (discussing the ratifiers and their common understanding with 
the framers as to the rule’s meaning). 
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containing more than one subject.316  This reality has been implicitly 
recognized in Indiana’s decisional law because devices have arisen to 
prevent the enforcement of each of Section 19’s prongs.317  Any framework 
for the analysis of single subject questions must account for the single 
subject rule’s dual prongs. 
One may ask why, if logrolling could be defined as combining 
multiple bills into one, the single subject rule did not simply prohibit the 
combination of bills.  That is to say, why did the framers elect to define 
their logrolling restriction in terms of subjects rather than in terms of 
procedure?  The framers undoubtedly recognized that a rule crafted in 
terms of combining bills previously introduced could easily be 
circumvented.  Legislators seeking to combine their unrelated bills could 
simply do so before introducing the new, combined product on the floor.  
Moreover, the framers were not opposed to all forms of logrolling:  
legislators could pass one another’s provisions so long as each of the 
unrelated provisions was passed as a separate act.  A third reason was the 
framers’ well-known aversion not only to logrolling, but also to the 
numerous substantive shortcomings that existed under the 1816 
Constitution.  This is illustrative of the degree to which the framers 
opposed logrolling, and bad law-making generally.  Section 19 was 
intended to prohibit both the procedure of logrolling, as well as the 
combination of disparate subjects under one heading.318 
G. The Single Subject Rule in Constitutional Context 
The single subject rule was intended to function as one piece in the 
larger puzzle of legislative reform.  Restriction of the legislature motivated 
the citizenry in its approval of the 1850 Convention, as well as their 
delegates at the Convention and the ratifiers who approved the final 
product.319  The ratifiers and their Convention delegates sought to 
                                                 
316 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19; see 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085 (establishing that 
the key purpose of this new rule was to prevent logrolling). 
317 See supra note 205 (expressing Mr. Smith’s concern that future courts would misread the 
framers’ intent by finding all legislative acts to be “reasonable” under Section 19).  In Indiana, 
the “enrolled act rule” precludes enforcement of Section 19’s procedural prong, while the 
substantive prong is eviscerated by a reasonableness standard so broad as to find all 
legislative acts compliant with Section 19.  Evans & Bannister, supra note 215.  These doctrines 
will also be addressed in a future Article. 
318 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19; 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1085. 
319 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2043 (providing an additional provision not included in 
the previous 1816 Constitution); supra Part III (examining the origins of Indiana’s single 
subject rule).  The framers explicitly declared so in their Address, introducing the summary 
of changes to the legislative branch, including Section 19, thusly:  “[t]he following provisions, 
tending to check and regulate the legislative branch of government, are not found in the old 
Constitution . . . .”  2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2043 (emphasis added). 
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circumscribe both the substance of legislation, as well as the manner of its 
enactment.320  Several delegates conceived of Section 19’s value within the 
context of Article 4.321  Because these provisions restricting the legislature 
were not only included in the 1851 Constitution, but also provided the 
impetus for a Convention to begin with, their enforcement is an 
indispensable element in fulfilling the intent of the framers and ratifiers.  
This is particularly true of Section 19, for which there is a specific and 
explicit intent that the single subject rule be judicially enforced.322  If 
Section 19 is an unenforced nullity in practice, then the framers’ and 
ratifiers’ intent has been defeated.323 
The framers did not simply intend that the single subject rule would 
be included in the Constitution.  They intended that it would be 
recognized as judicially cognizable—“the courts will decide.”324  The 
single subject rule’s commanding, non-discretionary language, as well as 
the Address to the Electors and the intrinsic judicial nature of such 
questions corroborate this understanding.  No evidence, either historical 
or legal, supports a contrary conclusion. 
The single subject rule did not offend the prevailing view of the 
separation of powers between the three branches of government.  Still, it 
                                                 
320 See generally IND. CONST. of 1851, art. I, art. IV, §§ 17–25, 27–29 (reviewing the Indiana 
Bill of Rights and examining provisions that directly restrict legislation); see also supra Part 
IV.F (exploring the single subject rule’s dual prongs). 
321 See, e.g.,  2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1086 (noting the remarks of Mr. Hall concerning 
other resolutions offered to curb legislative abuses, including the prohibition of special 
legislation, the single subject and title requirements of Section 19, and the requirement that 
votes for the final passage of every bill be recorded in the journals).  Unsurprisingly, Hall 
appreciated the value of the single subject rule in the context of the other reforms:  it was he 
who had introduced the October 9 resolutions, in which the single subject rule first appeared 
before the Convention.  Id.  Contemporary scholars have also acknowledged the rule’s value 
as a limit on the legislative process and its role in the scheme of legislative reform: 
The legislative process is another way the Indiana Constitution limits 
government . . . [c]onfining acts to a single related subject facilitates the 
public’s ability to be familiar with the content of legislation.  Access to 
the content of legislation is necessary because “acts must be circulated 
before they become a law” (Article [4], Section 28).  The circulation 
requirement gives the public the opportunity to voice its satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction that, in theory, may influence the decision of the elected 
officials. 
THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 428 (George E. Conner & Christopher W. 
Hammons eds., 2008). 
322 See supra Part IV.A.3 (reviewing the intent of the delegates in support and specifically, 
how the supporters made their case at the Convention); see also supra Part IV.A, IV.D 
(discussing the majority’s intent and the delegates opposed); supra Part IV.F (examining the 
single subject rule’s dual prongs). 
323 See supra Part IV (examining the dynamics of the 1850 Convention and 1851 ratification). 
324 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 1086.  See generally supra Part IV.D.3 (assessing the 
judiciary’s role in the single subject rule’s enforcement). 
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is worth noting that even if the single subject rule had upset the traditional 
notion of separation of powers, it was the framers’ prerogative to so alter the 
constitutional order.  Whether the framers were simply following tradition 
or were being legal trailblazers, their intent is “paramount” in affixing a 
meaning to Section 19.325  The wisdom of the framers’ choices is to be 
questioned and improved upon through the process of amendment 
provided for in the Constitution itself.  Contemporary jurisprudence 
remains obliged to fulfill the framers’ and ratifiers’ vision of an 
enforceable—indeed, a judicially enforced—prohibition of logrolling. 
V.  THE LINGUISTIC EVOLUTION OF SECTION 19:  CHANGES IN WORDING, BUT 
NOT INTENT 
The framers’ and ratifiers’ mutual intent with respect to Section 19 is 
clear.326  But Section 19 has been amended twice since the 1850 
Convention.  We must inquire whether it is proper to define the meaning 
of today’s Section 19 according to original intent, or whether some other 
intent has superseded that of the framers and ratifiers.  Many years ago, 
the Indiana Supreme Court established that: 
The adoption of a new [C]onstitution repeals and 
supersedes all the provisions of the old [C]onstitution not 
continued in force by the new instrument.  The same rule 
applies to amendments of an existing [C]onstitution which 
are inconsistent with the original text of the instrument 
amended . . .327 
The Court has declared that a constitutional “amendment is not to be 
considered as an isolated bit of design and color, but it must be seen as an 
integral part of the entire harmonious picture of the [C]onstitution” which 
“is superimposed upon that with which it is in direct conflict . . . .”328 
Hence, we must inquire as to whether the amendments to Section 19 
are “inconsistent” with the original text to the point of being in “direct 
conflict” with it.  Today’s Section 19 is not in direct conflict with the 
original text, and is in no way inconsistent with the original version.  
Consequently, the framers’ intent attached to the single subject rule 
retains its authority as the “paramount” reference in understanding the 
                                                 
325  See supra note 5 and accompanying text (stating that the meaning of a constitutional 
provision must be derived from the intent of the framers). 
326 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 95, at 2042 (discussing the intended impact of particular 
provisions, including Section 19, in the Address to the Electors). 
327 Griebel v. State, ex rel. Niezer, 12 N.E. 700, 703 (Ind. 1887) (emphasis added). 
328 Kirkpatrick v. King et al., 91 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ind. 1950) (emphasis added). 
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rule’s meaning today.  Part V.A discusses the 1960 Amendment to Section 
19.329   Part V.B then considers a second Amendment in 1974.330  Finally, 
Part V.C concludes that the original intent of the provision has been 
preserved.331 
A. The 1960 Amendment:  The Codification Exception Introduced 
In 1959, the Indiana General Assembly offered an amendment to 
Section 19 to provide that its single subject and title “requirements . . . shall 
not apply to original enactments of codifications of laws.”332  Also added 
was the stipulation that “every amendatory act and every amendment of 
a code shall identify the original act or code, as last amended, and the 
sections or subsections amended shall be set forth and published at full 
length.”333  This amendment was approved by the voters and took effect 
in 1960.334  Significantly, the single subject rule was retained and expanded 
to include amendatory and code acts.  In its entirety, Section 19 then read: 
Every act, amendatory act or amendment of a code shall 
embrace but one subject and matters properly connected 
therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title.  
But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, amendatory 
act or amendment of a code, which shall not be expressed 
in the title, such act, amendatory act or amendment of a 
code shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not 
be expressed in the title.  The requirements of this 
paragraph shall not apply to original enactments of 
codifications of laws. 
 
Every amendatory act and every amendment of a code 
shall identify the original act or code, as last amended, 
and the sections or subsections amended shall be set forth 
                                                 
329 See infra Part V.A (reviewing the rationale for the amendment in 1960 to the single 
subject provision). 
330 See infra Part V.B (discussing the 1974 amendment). 
331 See infra Part V.C (concluding that the delegates’ original intent for the single subject 
was ultimately preserved). 
332 State ex rel. Pearcy v. Crim. Court of Marion Cnty., 274 N.E.2d 519, 521 (Ind. 1971). 
333 Id. 
334 See Oddi, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that Indiana voters have approved the single subject 
rule on three occasions:  once in 1851, again in 1960, and then again in 1974). 
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and published at full length.  The identification required 
by this paragraph may be made by citation reference.335 
The historical record reveals that the 1960 amendment was motivated 
by two concerns:  simplifying the title requirement, and creating an 
exception to Section 19’s requirements for codifications.336  Codification 
was a topic of increasing concern in Indiana around this time.  Until 1971, 
the Indiana Code familiar to attorneys today did not exist.  Only sporadic 
codifications had been attempted throughout Indiana’s history, the last of 
which occurred in 1881.337  As a result, statutory laws simply piled up, 
organized into no official body of acts.  By the late 1960s, “[t]he volumes 
of session laws enacted since the 1852 [codification] had reached such 
proportions that, as a practical matter, research of official statute law was 
impossible without reliance upon unofficial sources.”338  The 1960 
amendment therefore appears to have been made in anticipation of 
ensuring the normalization of the codification process—a process long 
neglected and overdue in Indiana. 
Indeed, in 1969 the Indiana General Assembly directed its Legislative 
Council to begin preparations on a bill bringing into existence the first 
Indiana Code.339  At the same time, a special commission was established 
to oversee the actual work of codification.340  The Indiana Statute Revision 
Commission’s members included state representatives and senators as 
well as other leaders in Indiana law.341  Two years later, the Commission’s 
work was finished.342  “The Indiana Code of 1971 undertook not merely 
an updating, but a reenactment and rearrangement of viable statutory 
law.  The arrangement [into titles, articles, chapters and sections] was 
designed to accommodate new legislation in order to prolong the life of 
the Code and simplify future revision.”343  A new citation system on the 
title-article-chapter-section format was devised “to ensure that the 
General Assembly could accurately pinpoint legislation which it proposed 
                                                 
335 JOHN R. WALSH, LAWS OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1100–01 (Bookwalter Co., 1959); Pearcy, 
274 N.E.2d at 521. 
336 See Oddi, supra note 1, at 9–10 (noting the 1960 amendment sought “to remove the 
stigma Indiana had acquired in the field of titles to laws”) (citing 4 CHARLES 
KETTLEBOROUGH, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA 281–82 (John Bremmer ed., 1978)). 
337 See THE HISTORY OF INDIANA LAW, supra note 1, at 363–73. 
338 Id. at 373. 
339 Id. 
340 Id. 
341 Id. 
342 Id.  See generally Marcia J. Oddi & Margaret C. Attridge, The Indiana Code of 1971:  Its 
Preparation, Passage and Implications, 5 IND. L. FORUM 3 (1971) (providing a detailed and 
excellent overview of the creation of the 1971 Code). 
343 See THE HISTORY OF INDIANA LAW, supra note 1, at 373 (discussing the 1971 amendment). 
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to amend,” as required by the 1960 version of Section 19.344  The 1971 Code 
also “contained a provision repealing every statute enacted prior to 1971 
(with certain specified exceptions).”345  The General Assembly enacted the 
Code on January 22, 1971, whereupon it “was intended to have the status 
of past enacted revisions and thus provide a clear and unambiguous 
statement of Indiana statute law.”346 
The 1960 amendment to Section 19 had accomplished laying the 
groundwork for Indiana to finally begin a normalized, periodic 
codification process—or so the General Assembly believed.  After all of 
their work, Indiana’s legislators were soon to receive a surprise 
emanating, ironically, from the newly-amended Section 19. 
B. The 1974 Amendment: The Codification Exception Revised, the Title 
Requirement Removed 
Soon after its enactment, the constitutional status of the new Code was 
addressed in the November 1971 Indiana Supreme Court opinion of State 
ex rel. Pearcy v. Criminal Court of Marion County.347  In May 1971, defendant 
Anthony Newman was charged with First Degree Burglary.348  He was 
found guilty and the question of sentencing arose.349  In April, the month 
prior to the defendant’s indictment, Indiana’s governor approved a new 
statute, 1971 Public Law No. 155 (“P.L. 155”), which required sentencing 
judges to give defendants credit for time spent in jail while awaiting 
trial.350  Unsurprisingly, the defendant desired a shorter sentence and 
moved that he be sentenced according to P.L. 155.351  Noble Pearcy, the 
Marion County prosecutor, preferred that the defendant serve a longer 
sentence and opposed the motion.352  The trial court granted the 
defendant’s motion and the prosecutor appealed, claiming that P.L. 155 
was unconstitutional in violation of the prevailing 1960 version of the 
single subject rule.353 
The Indiana Supreme Court accepted the prosecutor’s appeal as an 
original action and issued a writ of mandate in an opinion dated 
                                                 
344 Id. at 374; see supra note 332 and accompanying text (stating the primary motivation for 
the amendments to Section 19 as accommodations to the codification process). 
345 THE HISTORY OF INDIANA LAW, supra note 1, at 374. 
346 Id. 
347 Pearcy v. Crim. Court of Marion Cnty., 274 N.E.2d 519, 519–23 (Ind. 1971). 
348 Id. at 519. 
349 Id. 
350 See LARRY A. CONRAD, LAWS OF THE STATE OF INDIANA, PASSED AT THE NINETY-SIXTH 
REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 655–56 (1969) (defining P.L. 155). 
351 Pearcy, 274 N.E.2d at 519–20. 
352 Id. at 520. 
353 Id. 
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September 24, 1971, requiring that the Marion County trial court, and all 
other courts of the state, disregard P.L. 155 when sentencing criminal 
defendants.354  The legislature was unrepresented at the hearing upon 
which the September opinion was based.355  After the September 24 
opinion was issued, the General Assembly, led by Phillip Gutman, 
president pro tempore of the Indiana Senate and chairman of the Indiana 
Code Revision Commission, filed an amicus brief with the Indiana 
Supreme Court.356  The Court thereupon issued a revised opinion—the 
controlling opinion in the case, dated November 1, 1971—which largely 
reaffirmed the September opinion and which responded more directly to 
the arguments made in the Legislature’s amicus brief. 357 
In its November opinion, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed two 
major issues: first, whether the 1971 Indiana Code itself was fully 
compliant with the requirements of Section 19; and second, whether P.L. 
155 in particular had complied with the single subject rule.358  With respect 
to the Code, the Legislature’s amicus brief requested that the Court: 
                                                 
354 See id. (“the application of the questioned Act (Public Law 155) will have a profound 
immediate effect upon the administration of criminal justice”); Oddi, supra note 1, at 11–12 
(noting that the Indiana Supreme Court decided that the Indiana Code of 1971 was a 
violation of Article IV, Section 19). 
355 See Pearcy, 274 N.E.2d at 520 (noting that the legislature was not a party to the action).  
Despite its interest, the legislature did not file an amicus brief until after the September 
opinion was handed down.  Id.  The General Assembly genuinely believed that it had 
complied with Section 19’s requirements and anticipated the result opposite that reached by 
the Court.  See THE HISTORY OF INDIANA LAW, supra note 1, at 374 (noting that the legislature 
believed the Code was covered by an exception); see also infra note 359 and accompanying 
text (noting the legislature’s surprised response to Pearcy). 
356 Pearcy, 274 N.E.2d at 520. 
357 See id. at 519 (noting that the November opinion superseded the September opinion).  
Because it was superseded only five weeks after it was handed down, the September opinion 
was never published in the North Eastern Reporter. 
358  See id. at 519–22 (addressing whether the Indiana Code and P.L. 155 complied with the 
single subject rule).  The fate of P.L. 155 was not to be a happy one.  P.L. 155 was the amended 
version of a statute originally enacted in 1857.  See CONRAD, supra note 350, at 655 (noting the 
date the law was enacted).  As such, P.L. 155 was subject to the single subject requirement.  
See IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19 (requiring acts to be limited to a single subject).  The 
original text of the law concerned several particulars regarding prison officials.  CONRAD, 
supra note 350, at 655.  The language at issue in Pearcy, which was added to the 1857 statute 
by P.L. 155, concerned the sentencing of convicted defendants.  Id. at 656.  The Court 
concluded that: 
Public Law 155 is clearly double and embraces two subjects which are 
not properly connected.  There is no apparent relation between the 
subject of prison officials and employees and the subject of the length 
and diminution of sentences of convicts, and none is disclosed in either 
the title or body of Public Law 155.  Therefore, Public Law 155, in its 
entirety, is in violation of Art. [IV], [Section] 19, and is ineffective as an 
amendment to [the original act then codified in the 1971 Code]. 
Pearcy, 274 N.E.2d at 522–23. 
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[1] affirm the validity of [all of] the 1971 Session laws 
[including P.L. 155] . . . [2] affirm the validity of the Acts 
of subsequent Sessions of the Indiana General Assembly 
[that is, the acts of future legislatures to be codified, 
presumably, in the same manner as existing statutes had 
been codified in the 1971 Code] . . . [and 3] affirm the 
validity of the Indiana Code of 1971 [that is, the Code 
itself].359 
The Court rejected the first two requests as untenable—“[a]t the outset, 
we are compelled to comment that the first and second requests . . . cannot 
reasonably be met . . . .  In regard to the third request, we can do no more 
than to define the legal significance of the Indiana Code of 1971.”360 
The Court then proceeded with its analysis, finding that Section 19’s 
exception of codifications from the single subject and title requirements 
applied exclusively to “original enactments of codifications of laws.”361  
“Readily apparent,” the Court wrote, “is the significant plural 
designations in” the codifications phrase, and “[i]t is a reasonable 
construction to interpret such plurals as referring to a series of separate codes 
each containing a single general subject and matters properly connected 
therewith . . . .”362  The 1971 Code, of course, contained a “multitude . . . of 
subjects” and represented a comprehensive codification of all effective 
statutory law in the state.363  Hence, the Court reasoned, the Code “is in 
reality nothing more than an official comprehensive compilation of all of 
the legislative Acts, just as Burns Annotated Statutes is a similar private 
compilation of the same laws.”364 
While the Code’s references to its codified prior acts met the citation 
requirement added to Section 19 in 1960, “each and every viable statute or 
section thereof contained [in the Code], shall remain in effect unless or 
until repealed or amended by an Act of the General Assembly which 
satisfies the title and single subject requirements of Art. IV, 
[Section]  19.”365  As the Court saw it, the single subject rule, under its 1960 
incantation, forbade what the legislature had attempted.  The Code, then: 
[H]ad official status . . . however, [the Pearcy opinion] 
refused to recognize the repeal and replacement of prior 
                                                 
359 Pearcy, 274 N.E.2d at 520. 
360 Id. 
361 Id. at 522.  
362 Id. at 521 (emphasis added). 
363 Id. at 522. 
364 Id. 
365 Pearcy, 274 N.E.2d at 522. 
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session laws by the 1971 Code.  Citations to its provisions 
were treated as alternate citations to the session laws from 
which the Code provisions were derived.  The Court’s 
opinion was based on the requirements then found in 
Article [IV], Section 19 . . . .  The General Assembly had 
been aware of this requirement, but acted on the premise 
that the Code was covered by an exception to the 
requirement for “original enactments of codifications of 
laws”; . . . the Court construed the exception narrowly 
and found that the Code did not fall within its sweep.366 
As a result: 
The decision in the Pearcy case posed a problem for the 
legislature.  While there was now an official organized 
structure for the statutes, and Code citations could be 
used instead of more cumbersome session law citations, 
the contents of the Indiana Code of 1971 could not be 
relied upon as the law.  In addition, the status of nonviable 
statutes which had been intentionally excluded from the 
Indiana Code of 1971 in order that they be repealed was 
left in doubt.367 
The legislature responded to this by proposing an amendment, 
approved in 1974, to the language of Section 19.368  Although Pearcy had 
been based on both the single subject and title requirements, the single 
subject rule was nevertheless retained.  The third, and present, version of 
Section 19 was then born—“[a]n act, except an act for the codification, 
revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject and 
matters properly connected therewith.”369  The vastly simplified 
amendment accomplished three goals: (1) it did away with the title 
requirement; (2) it made explicit the exemption for codifications from the 
                                                 
366 THE HISTORY OF INDIANA LAW, supra note 1, at 374 (discussing the 1960 amendment). 
367  Id. 
368 Id. 
369 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19, amended Nov. 5, 1974; see THE HISTORY OF INDIANA 
LAW, supra note 1, at 375 (noting that after the new amendment was ratified in 1974, the 
Indiana General Assembly again passed an “Indiana Code,” which was signed into law on 
January 21, 1976).  The 1976 Code was “very similar to the Indiana Code of 1971, retaining 
virtually the same arrangement and citation system.”  Id.  “With the [1976] enactment of the 
Indiana Code, Indiana had an official body of statutory law and an unambiguous source of 
reference for future legislative action.”  Id.  West published the first official edition in 1976 
and this has been updated ever since.  Id. 
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single subject rule; and (3) most significantly, it retained the single subject 
rule. 370 
C. The Result is Continuity:  Original Intent Preserved 
This discussion has illustrated why the intent of the Constitution’s 
framers and ratifiers continues to govern the meaning of Section 19.371  As 
Justice Brent Dickson has observed, “the citizens of Indiana recently 
reaffirmed their demand for the single-subject requirement.  Although 
[Section 19] was amended in 1960 and 1974, the voters retained the single-
subject requirement for all acts except those ‘for the codification, revision 
or rearrangement of laws.’”372  The fact that the single subject rule was 
retained is, by itself, sufficient evidence that the ratifiers of the 1960 and 
1974 amendments intended to retain the meaning originally attached to 
the rule.  This is the most logical inference:  had the amendments’ authors 
intended to alter the meaning then inherent in the single subject rule, they 
would have made a material alteration to the rule itself to reflect such an 
intent.  Indiana’s common law, moreover, embraces this notion.373 
With respect to the rule’s language, only one altered phrase that has 
not yet been discussed exists between the original version and that of 
today: the word “embrace” has been replaced by “confined.”374  This 
change does not reflect an intent to detach original intent from the single 
                                                 
370 See infra Part V.C (implying that the legislature and voters of 1974 did not share William 
Dunn’s concern that without a limitation on the portion to be voided, based upon the 
expressed and unexpressed portions in the Act’s title, opponents of an act would seek 
deliberately to diversify it).  Modern legislators and voters apparently view this possibility 
as one to be addressed within the legislature, by the legislature’s own internal rules of 
procedure.  The courts cannot be called upon to save legislation otherwise in violation of 
Section 19 on the grounds that a legislative minority successfully diversified the Act. 
371 See generally supra Part IV (discussing this intent). 
372 Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. 1995) (Dickson, J., dissenting); see also In re A.B., 
949 N.E.2d at 1224 (Dickson, J., concurring) (finding that the 1974 amendment to Section 19 
meant that Indiana’s “single-subject requirement stands expressly endorsed not only by the 
framers and ratifiers of Indiana’s 1851 Constitution but also by the General Assembly and 
voters one hundred twenty-three years later”). 
373 See, e.g., Bayh v. Ind. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 674 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ind. 
1996) (rejecting the alleged single subject violation in question, but acknowledging that “one 
of the purposes of Art. [IV], [Section] 19 is to prevent ‘logrolling’ legislation”).  Indiana’s 
contemporary decisional law, all of which has rejected claimed single subject violations 
under the 1974 language, has acknowledged that the intent of Section 19 is to prevent 
logrolling, thereby implicitly recognizing the continued vitality of the framers’ intent in the 
modern version of the single subject rule. 
374 Compare IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19 (“Every act shall embrace but one subject and 
matters properly connected therewith . . . “ (emphasis added)) with IND. CONST. art. IV, § 19, 
amended Nov. 5, 1974 (“An act, except an act for the codification, revision or rearrangement 
of laws, shall be confined to one subject and matters properly connected therewith.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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subject rule, for today’s meaning of “confined to one” accomplishes the 
same limitation embodied in the 1850 phrase “embrace but one.”375  The 
term chosen in 1974 is simply a modern phraseology intended to preserve 
original intent. 
A final, definitive piece of evidence supporting the continuity of 
original intent is provided by the Honorable Ray Richardson, the author 
and sponsor of the 1974 amendment.376  Richardson served on the Indiana 
Statute Revision Commission and was also a member of the Indiana 
House of Representatives.377  Richardson took the lead on the Legislature’s 
response to Pearcy by sponsoring House Joint Resolution 4, the purpose of 
which was “to simplify and clarify the technical requirements for acts.”378  
By early 1973, the amended language had passed the Legislature as 
required by the Constitution and was approved by the Governor as Public 
Law 349 on April 16, 1973.379  The voters of Indiana approved the 
amendment in 1974.380 
Mr. Richardson explained that the General Assembly had indeed 
believed that the 1971 Code fell within the codification exception of the 
1960 version of the single subject rule.381  Notwithstanding the Pearcy 
decision, Indiana still demanded a system of organized and unambiguous 
statutory law.  Hence, “the primary reason for the [1974] amendment was 
the language that permits codifications.”382  The legislature also removed 
the title requirement in the 1974 amendment because the titles to the 
                                                 
375 Compare THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 279 
(William Morris ed., American Heritage Publishing Co. 1969) (defining “confine” as “[t]o 
keep within bounds; restrict”), with WEBSTER, supra note 176, at 292 (defining “embrace” as 
“[t]o comprehend; to include or take in . . . [t]o comprise”). 
376 Email from Hon. Ray Richardson, attorney at law, civic leader, and former member of 
the Indiana House of Representatives (Aug. 11, 2009, 12:32 PM) (confirming that he was the 
author of HJR 4); see JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF INDIANA:  
FIRST REGULAR SESSION OF THE NINETY-EIGHTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 29–30 (1973) [hereinafter 
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES] (memorializing Mr. Richardson’s sponsorship 
of HJR 4). 
377 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 376, at 29–30; see also Email from 
Hon. Ray Richardson, supra note 376 (detailing his time in the House). 
378 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19; JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra 
note 377, at 30 (emphasis added).  The legislature’s use of the word “requirements” is 
instructive:  even the legislature itself acknowledges the status of the single subject rule as a 
mandatory provision; the framers did not intend to embed any discretionary element.  See 
generally supra Part III (explaining the origins of Section 19). 
379 2 LAWS OF THE STATE OF INDIANA:  PASSED AT THE FIRST REGULATION SESSION OF THE 
NINETY-EIGHTH INDIANA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2004 (1973). 
380 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19, amended Nov. 5, 1974; THE HISTORY OF INDIANA LAW, 
supra note 1, at 374. 
381 Email from Hon. Ray Richardson, supra note 376; see supra note 359 and accompanying 
text (noting the legislature’s surprised response to Pearcy). 
382 Email from Hon. Ray Richardson, supra note 376. 
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legislature’s acts “were quite lengthy, [and] still there was much litigation 
over whether a particular nuance was covered.”383  In other words, a 
desire to remove the title requirement alone might not have inspired 
legislative action, but since Section 19’s language was to be amended to 
address codification anyway, the legislature also took the opportunity to 
simplify the Section’s other requirements.384 
The single subject rule’s retention was not accidental.  Mr. Richardson 
explained that legislators affirmatively desired a one-subject-per-bill-limit 
because most lawmakers appreciate the constitutional prerogative of 
voting exclusively for what they desire.385  From the legislative 
perspective, the single subject rule creates greater freedom; without it, 
legislators are forced to base their votes upon whether they want to “take 
the good with the bad.”  
In conclusion, the intent originally attached to Section 19 remains 
authoritative.  The single subject rule was retained in both subsequent 
versions of Section 19, and the only substantive linguistic change to the 
rule was a modernization of the phraseology.386 The sponsor of the 1974 
change confirms that the legislature valued, and intended to retain, the 
rule.387  The fact that the title requirement was done away with is 
immaterial insofar as the single subject rule is concerned.  Although the 
two provisions were originally designed to work in tandem, the purposes 
of the single subject rule existed independently from that of the title 
requirement.388  Like the change in verbiage from “embrace” to “confine,” 
the removal of the title requirement did nothing to detach the framers’ 
intent for the single subject rule from today’s version of Section 19.389 
VI.  THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE IN OTHER STATES 
To summarize thus far, Indiana’s framers and ratifiers 
unambiguously intended that the single subject rule would preclude the 
procedural evil of logrolling (or, at least, its most negative form), as well 
as the substantive evil of multiple subjects in an act.390  The Indiana 
                                                 
383 Id. 
384 Id. 
385 Id. 
386 Compare IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19 (noting original language), with IND. CONST. 
of 1851, art. IV, § 19, amended Nov. 5, 1974 (introducing the Section’s new language). 
387 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19, amended Nov. 5, 1974. 
388 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (noting that the prevention of logrolling was 
one of the two purposes of the amendment that introduced the single subject rule at the 1850 
Convention). 
389 IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19, amended Nov. 5, 1974. 
390 See supra Part IV.A.3 (noting that the Indiana Convention majority intended to prohibit 
only logrolling that results in multiple subjects within the same act, and not logrolling that 
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framers and ratifiers unambiguously intended that the courts would 
actively hear and evaluate claims based upon the single subject rule.391  We 
now turn to examine what the other forty single subject states have found 
with respect to the purposes and meanings of their respective rules.392  
Part VI.A begins by discussing the purposes of the single subject rule in 
other states.393  Then, Part VI.B analyzes additional purposes, beyond the 
primary purposes, that other states have found germane to the single-
subject provision.394 
                                                 
results in a package of acts, each of which is limited to a single discrete subject and passes on 
its own merits); supra Part IV.F (comparing the procedural and substantive goals of the single 
subject rule). 
391 See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 35(b) (“[t]he legislature is solely responsible for determining 
compliance with the rule”).  However, no such restriction applies to Texas’ single subject 
rule.  Id. § 35(a).  No other single subject state’s constitution removes the title requirement 
from the courts’ jurisdiction and no state, including Texas, removes the single subject rule 
from the realm of justiciability.  Despite this, an alarming number of states’ courts have, at 
various points throughout time, removed the single subject rule from their own jurisdiction 
through case law.  See, e.g., Kueckelhan v. Fed. Old Line Ins. Co., 418 P.2d 443, 451 (Wash. 
1966) (reasoning that, on the sole basis of other case precedent, “this constitutional 
requirement is to be liberally construed so as not to impose awkward and hampering 
restrictions upon the legislature,” and, “[c]onsequently, the legislature is deemed the judge of 
the scope which it will give to the word ‘subject’” (emphasis added)).  See generally supra Part 
IV (explaining why such a maneuver is in conflict with the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent).  
This is the subject of a future Article by the authors.  Evans & Bannister, supra note 215. 
392 See supra Part VI.A (observing the few states that rely upon evidence of the framers’ and 
ratifiers’ intent as they formulated their decisional law).  We have also noted that for many 
states, there have been few alternatives since the historical record of many states is quiet or 
altogether silent on the single subject rule.  The 1872 Tennessee case of Cannon v. Mathes 
supplies a helpful illustration of how state supreme courts have been forced to infer their 
framers’ intent.  Cannon v. Mathes, 55 Tenn. 504, 505 (1872).  The court confronted the 
question as to why both a single subject provision and a title requirement had been included 
in the state’s constitution, and which, if either, was judicially cognizable.  Id.  There, the court 
said: 
Plausible reasons might be given to show, that it was not essential to the 
object which the Convention sought to accomplish, that the subject of 
legislation should be imperatively indicated in the titles of bills, but 
where there is no real ambiguity in the language employed, we have no 
right to fritter away the obvious import of that language by construction.  
The Convention evidently designed to cut up by the roots, not only the 
pernicious system of legislation, which embraced in one act 
incongruous and independent subjects, but also the evil practice of 
giving titles to acts which conveyed no real information as to the objects 
embraced in its provisions. 
Id. at 518 (emphasis added). 
393 See infra Part VI.A (discussing the judicially-inferred purposes of the single-subject 
provision in states other than Indiana). 
394 See infra Part VI.B (discussing ancillary purposes for the single subject rule). 
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A. The Purposes in Other States 
It appears that the most frequently-cited purpose of the single subject 
rule is the prevention of deception.395  In particular, the single subject rule 
is purportedly intended to prevent the deception of legislators as to the 
contents of the acts on which they will vote or to prevent the public from 
being deceived as to what their elected representatives are considering or 
passing into law, or both.  Significantly, however, most states in which the 
prevention of deception is cited as a purpose for the single subject rule 
remain tied to the title requirement as well.396  Recall that the Indiana framers 
had originally included the single subject provision and the title 
requirement together (as most states’ constitutions do now)—but that the 
Indiana framers also designated different purposes for each provision.397  
Specifically, the title requirement was to prevent deception, while the 
single subject rule was to prevent logrolling and the joining of legal 
initiatives belonging to different subjects.398 
The prevention of logrolling and preventing the joining of disparate 
subjects were the Indiana framers’ two primary purposes for the single 
subject rule.399  A majority of single subject states have acknowledged 
these purposes as to their single subject rules as well.400  Nearly all single 
subject states acknowledge the importance of the rule’s plain language—
                                                 
395 See Thompson v. McKinley Cnty., 816 P.2d 494, 500 (N.M. 1991) (“The mischief to be 
prevented is . . .  surprise or fraud on the legislature . . . ”); State v. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d 472, 
473 (Iowa 1990) (noting the single subject rule “facilitates the legislative process by 
preventing surprise when legislators are not informed”); Kerner v. Johnson, 583 P.2d 360, 
379 (Idaho 1978) (“The purpose of this constitutional provision is to prevent fraud and 
deception in the enactment of laws . . . ”); Wash. State Sch. Dirs. Ass’n v. Dep’t. of Labor & 
Indus., 510 P.2d 818, 821 (Wash. 1973) (noting that among the rule’s purposes is “to protect 
and enlighten the members of the legislature”); see also McIntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 853–
54 (Or. 1996) (distinguishing the prevention of deception as a role of the title requirement 
and not the single subject rule); Kline v. N.J. Racing Comm., 183 A.2d 48, 52–53 (N.J. 1962) 
(noting that the prevention of deception is commonly tied to the title requirement).  This 
Article is aligned with Oregon’s view on this point.  See infra note 397 and accompanying 
text (noting the different purposes for the single subject rule and the title requirement). 
396 One exception is Illinois.  See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8.d (requiring only that bills “be 
confined to one subject”).  As we have seen, the 1974 amendment to Indiana’s single subject 
rule illustrates that the rule does not depend upon the title requirement for its existence.  IND. 
CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 19.  Rather, the single subject rule exists for its own purposes, 
independently and apart from the purposes that motivated the title requirement.  See also 
supra Part IV.F (analyzing the dual purposes of the single subject rule in detail). 
397 See supra Part IV (discussing comments at the Indiana Constitutional Convention); supra 
Part IV.C (noting that other provisions in the Indiana Constitution would guard against 
legislator ignorance respecting the contents of bills, and that the single subject rule was 
therefore included for purposes other than that). 
398 See supra Part IV.A (discussing logrolling as an evil which must be cured). 
399 See supra Part IV.F (discussing these dual purposes). 
400 See infra notes 401–02 and accompanying text (discussing examples). 
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the purpose of the single subject rule is to prevent the joining of two or 
more different subjects under one act or heading.401  More than half of the 
states’ case law has also recognized that the rule is intended to 
disincentivize logrolling.402  Many states have expressly acknowledged 
that the rule’s primary or overriding purpose is to combat logrolling.403 
Three additional purposes are sometimes cited for the single subject 
rule.  These are less often mentioned purposes for the rule and hence, we 
label them the “minor” purposes.  First, some states have found that the 
rule exists to ensure that every subject considered and passed into law will 
be considered on its own merits.404  The desirability of requiring all acts to 
                                                 
401 See, e.g., Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 290 (Wyo. 
1994) (noting that the rule prohibits “the combination in the same bill or initiative of 
unrelated and separate subjects that have nothing to do with the subject of the original 
legislation . . . ”); In re Marriage of Thompson, 398 N.E.2d 17, 20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (stating 
that the single subject rule “was designed to prevent the joinder of incongruous and 
unrelated matters in one act”); Baltimore Transit Co. v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 194 A.2d 
643, 649 (Md. 1963) (noting that the rule exists “to prevent the combination in one act of 
several distinct and incongruous subjects”); Rosebud Cnty. v. Flinn, 98 P.2d 330, 334 (Mont. 
1940) (“The purpose requiring singleness of subject is to prevent the practice . . . of embracing 
in the same bill incongruous matters . . . ” (internal quotation marks removed)); Catron v. 
Bd. of Comm’rs, of Archuleta Cnty., 33 P. 513, 514 (Colo. 1893) (stating that the rule prohibits 
“[t]he practice of putting together in one bill subjects having no necessary or proper 
connection”). 
402 See, e.g., Pa. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 64 A.3d 611, 615–16 (Pa. 
2013) (“the single subject rule limits the practice of ‘logrolling’”); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. S.C. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 677 S.E.2d 16, 18 (S.C. 2009) (noting that “[t]he purpose of Article III, § 17 
[is] . . . to prevent legislative ‘log-rolling’”); State ex rel. Citizens Against Tolls v. Murphy, 88 
P.3d 375, 387 (Wash. 2004) (“the purpose of this prohibition is to prevent logrolling or 
pushing legislation through by attaching it to other necessary or desirable legislation (citing 
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183, 207 (Wash. 2006))); Fla. 
Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Critchfield, 842 So.2d 782, 785 (Fla. 2003) (“The 
purpose of this constitutional prohibition against a plurality of subjects in a single legislative 
act is to prevent ‘log-rolling’ where a single enactment becomes a cloak for dissimilar 
legislation having no necessary or appropriate connection with the subject matter.” (quoting 
Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 1991))); State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste, 464 N.E.2d 153, 
155 (Ohio 1984) (“The primary and universally recognized purpose of such provisions is to 
prevent logrolling”). 
403 See, e.g., Kincaid v. Mangum, 432 S.E.2d 74, 82 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that “an omnibus 
bill to authorize legislative rules” violated the single subject rule because such a bill “can 
lead to logrolling or other deceiving tactics”); Gellert v. State, 522 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Alaska 
1974) (“It is generally agreed that the primary aim of ‘one subject’ provisions in state 
constitutions is the restraint of logrolling in the legislative process”); Planned Parenthood 
Affiliates of Cal. v. Swoap, 219 Cal. Rptr. 664, 670 (Cal. 1985) (declaring that “[i]t was to cure 
this evil [of logrolling] that the constitution made it mandatory that a bill should embrace 
but one subject-matter” (quoting Ex parte Hallawell, 99 P. 490, 491 (Cal. 1909)). 
404 See, e.g., Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356, 1362 (Colo. 1988) (naming among the three 
purposes of the rule “to guarantee that each legislative proposal passes on its own merit”); 
Simpson v. Tobin, 367 N.W.2d 757, 767 (S.D. 1985) (stating that the rule was intended to 
prevent the combination of “diverse measures which have no common basis except, perhaps 
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pass on their own merits was raised and endorsed by Indiana’s framers as 
well.405 
This topic invites us to revisit a question posed earlier:  why did the 
framers in Indiana (and in the other states that recognize logrolling as a 
key motive for the single subject rule) attempt to prohibit a procedural evil 
by a substantive restriction?406  Otherwise stated, why did the framers 
address a substantive issue, when it was primarily a procedural issue they 
sought to remedy?  The presence of two subjects in an act does not 
necessarily indicate that the act was the product of logrolling.  It is 
conceivable that a legislator who cares passionately about two issues—
two separate subjects—would merge her proposals regarding the two 
issues into a single act.  At such a juncture, no logrolling would have taken 
place.  Instead, the legislator might draft such a bill having never spoken 
with another legislator about the proposals.  The framers’ and ratifiers’ 
extensive anecdotal experience suggested to them that an act containing 
multiple subjects was usually procured through logrolling.  That is, the 
existence of multiple subjects in a bill is good inferential evidence of 
logrolling, but as our hypothetical legislator demonstrates, a multi-subject 
act does not establish conclusively that logrolling occurred.407  So why 
prohibit logrolling by substantive means? 
One likely answer is that the framers implicitly perceived that the 
correlation between multi-subject acts and logrolling was so strong that it 
was a “good enough” solution to logrolling.  In this line of reasoning, the 
framers elected for the subject language because multiple subjects are 
easier to prove as a practical matter than logrolling.408  There is also 
                                                 
their separate inability to receive a favorable vote on their own merits”); Oxnard Beet Sugar 
Co. v. State, 102 N.W. 80, 81 (Neb. 1905) (naming the purpose of the rule as “to require each 
proposed measure to stand upon its own merits”); State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 
29 P. 974, 975 (Nev. 1892) (describing the purpose of the rule as to prevent the passage of 
matters “many of which could not be carried upon their own merits”); State v. Cassidy, 22 
Minn. 312, 322 (1875) (describing the purpose of the rule as “to secure to every distinct 
measure of legislation a separate consideration and decision”); Cutlip v. Sheriff of Calhoun 
Cnty., 3 W. Va. 588, 590 (1869) (giving as one of the two purposes of the rule “to secure a fair 
and impartial consideration of each subject by making it stand or fall on its merits”). 
405 See supra Part IV.A.3 (describing the motion to amend and implement the single subject 
rule). 
406 See supra Part IV.F (exploring the interrelationship between the procedural and 
substantive aspects of the rule). 
407 Rephrasing this in a mathematical vein, multi-subject acts may be highly correlated 
with logrolling, but such a correlation does not establish that either phenomenon has caused 
the other. 
408 Whether logrolling occurred or not in a given instance is an empirical assessment.  From 
the judicial vantage, this is a question of fact.  Yet evidence of logrolling may not always be 
direct, since logrolling can occur outside of the public’s view.  In contrast, evidence of 
multiple subjects in an act is always “directly” available, so long as the act itself is publicly 
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another equally valid explanation—logrolling was not the sole purpose 
behind the single subject rule.  The framers viewed multi-subject acts as 
an additional discrete evil to be remedied.409  We have also already 
observed that the framers (in Indiana and elsewhere) appreciated the 
added benefit of requiring acts—even those that were not procured 
through logrolling—to be confined to one subject.  One-subject acts, even 
if they are passed individually as part of a broader “package” of logrolled 
measures, must stand on their own merits, must each be scrutinized (at 
least partially) in isolation from other measures, and preserve the 
governor’s ability to selectively sign or veto. 
Two additional “minor” purposes for the single subject rule have been 
proffered in the decisional law throughout the states.  The single subject 
rule’s second “minor” purpose is to free legislators from the burden of 
voting for provisions they would not ordinarily vote for to pass other 
items that they do favor.410  The third “minor” rationale for the single 
                                                 
available.  Courts are at liberty to take judicial notice of an act’s existence.  The number of 
subjects existing within an act, then, is a question of law. 
409 See supra note 253 and accompanying text (noting that the Indiana framers viewed 
multi-subject acts as evils in themselves for many reasons and that among these was the fact 
that multi-subject acts virtually always contained provisions wholly unrelated to one 
another, some or all of which were, by definition, unmeritorious).  This insight is further 
bolstered by the fact that judicial discussions of the rule’s purposes very often explicitly 
intermingle these purposes.  See, e.g., Catron v. Bd. of Comm’rs, of Archuleta Cnty., 33 P. 513, 
514 (Colo. 1893) (combining the purposes of preventing logrolling and ensuring that subjects 
stand on their own merit by declaring that “one of the evils sought to be eradicated” was 
“[t]he practice of putting together in one bill subjects having no necessary or proper 
connection, for the purpose of enlisting in support of such bill the advocates of each measure, 
and thus securing the enactment of measures that could not be carried upon their merits”); 
State v. Earley, 386 P.2d 221, 226 (Kan. 1963) (combining the purposes of precluding multi-
subject acts and preserving legislators’ ability to vote only for subjects that they favor).  This 
is logically unobjectionable.  Many factors inspired the single subject rule’s creation, and 
these factors are not mutually exclusive.  Delegates to the constitutional conventions 
throughout the states favored the single subject rule for numerous reasons. 
410 Earley, 386 P.2d at 226 (describing the purpose of the rule as “to prevent two or more 
unrelated subjects being covered in an act so that members of the legislature would feel that 
they should vote for a bill which contained a provision to which they were opposed in order 
to secure the enactment of the bill with some provisions they considered important” (quoting 
Shrout v. Rinker, 84 P.2d 974, 976 (Kan. 1938))); Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 233 P.3d 
380, 381 (Okla. 2010) (defining logrolling as “the practice of assuring the passage of a law by 
creating one choice in which a legislator or voter is forced to assent to an unfavorable 
provision to secure the passage of a favorable one”); State v. Cooper, 382 So.2d 963, 965 (La. 
1980) (“[a] legislator should not have to consider the validity of two unrelated objects in 
deciding how to vote on a bill”); State v. Waggoner, 490 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Wash. 1971) (stating 
that “logrolling does not exist unless the component provisions of an enactment embrace 
more than one subject”); Neuenschwander v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 48 A.2d 
593, 599 (Md. 1946) (stating that the purpose of the rule was to combat the practice in which 
“members of the Legislature were often constrained to vote for such foreign provisions to 
avoid jeopardizing the main subject or to secure new strength for it”).  Indiana legislators 
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subject rule is the preservation of the integrity of the governor’s veto.  
Because most state governors do not have a “subject” veto and must 
accept bills in their entirety or veto them in their entirety, the single subject 
rule helps to ensure that governors can separately consider bills 
addressing different subjects.411 
B. The Single Subject Rule Across the States:  Continuity of Purpose 
We conclude our look across the states by noting that the single 
subject rule has several purposes.  Its major or primary purposes are to 
invalidate multi-subject acts, and to invalidate acts that are procured through 
logrolling.412  More specifically, the single subject rule stands in opposition 
to only one variant of logrolling—namely, logrolling that results in multi-
subject acts.  Logrolling that is achieved by the passage of multiple one-
subject acts is, from the vantage of the single subject rule, altogether 
unobjectionable.413 
Additionally, the single subject rule has several “minor” purposes.  
The rule is intended to guarantee that every subject considered and passed 
into law will be considered on its own merits, that legislators will be free 
to vote as they please on each subject considered for passage, and that the 
governor will similarly be free to approve or veto each subject passed by 
the legislature.  The purpose of preventing deception falls under the 
gambit of the title requirement—a complimentary but discrete mandate 
existing in all single subject states except Indiana and Illinois, requiring 
that an act’s subject be expressed in its title. 
This survey of states yields three more noteworthy observations.  
First, the conclusions that most states have drawn as to the purposes of 
their respective single subject rules are consistent with this paper’s 
analysis of the purposes underlying Indiana’s version of the rule.  This is 
significant because few, if any, of the other single subject states have such 
a clear and reliable historical record as Indiana’s.  The fact that the rule’s 
avowed purpose has evolved over time in many states is a reflection of the 
curious fact that most states have interpreted the meaning of the rule 
                                                 
valued this as well in proposing the 1974 amendment to Indiana’s single subject rule.  See 
supra note 385 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons for legislators’ support of the 
amended single subject rule in Indiana). 
411 See, e.g., In re House Bill No. 1353, 738 P.2d 371, 372 (Colo. 1987) (noting that the single 
subject rule “enables the governor to consider each single subject of legislation separately 
and independently in determining whether to exercise his veto power”).  Colorado has taken 
the lead on this doctrine.   
412 See supra Part III (introducing the evils that predicated the necessity for a single subject 
rule). 
413 See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing this form of logrolling in the context of the enactment 
of the Indiana single subject rule). 
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without reference to a historical record establishing the rule’s true 
purposes.  In contrast, Indiana’s historical record is complete, compelling, 
and unambiguous.  Indiana should serve as a persuasive authority for 
states that desire a definitive resolution concerning the rule’s purposes 
and meaning and, by extension, to the question of what generalizable 
framework is best-suited to guide single subject analyses. 
This discussion’s second key take-away is that the many purposes of 
the single subject rule sometimes overlap and often complement one 
another.  Whatever framework is chosen for single subject rule analysis 
ought to defend and advance all of these purposes, and especially the 
rule’s major purposes.  To the extent that a state has adopted a framework 
for analysis that frustrates or defeats any one or more of the rule’s 
purposes, or to the extent that a state accomplishes the same end by not 
articulating any framework whatsoever, the legal test is conclusively 
flawed.  In this event, alternative frameworks for single subject analysis 
should be sought out. 
The final key point is that no state’s constitution removes the single 
subject rule from the courts’ jurisdiction.  The Texas Constitution is unique 
among single subject states in that it expressly removed the title 
requirement from the realm of justiciability.414  The Texas example 
demonstrates that the many states’ framers and ratifiers could have 
removed single subject questions from judicial review.  In states in which 
the historical record is scant, the absence of such a removal supports the 
view that the state’s framers intended that the courts would enforce the 
single subject rule.  In the case of Indiana, the historical record 
unmistakably establishes this intent.  It follows that whatever framework 
or legal test a state might formulate for the purpose of evaluating single 
subject challenges, the framework cannot, either expressly or in effect, 
frustrate or defeat the process of judicial review.  Such a framework would 
not only conflict with, but would affirmatively undermine, the many 
purposes of the single subject rule. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The framers and ratifiers of the 1851 Indiana Constitution intended 
that the single subject rule would nullify multi-subject acts, as well as 
those procured through logrolling, so that each subject passed upon 
would be duly considered.  Unlike many provisions of the Indiana 
Constitution that must be interpreted solely upon circumstantial 
evidence, analogous constitutional provisions, and logical inference, the 
meaning and purposes of Section 19 are robustly established by direct 
                                                 
414 See supra note 391 (discussing the Texas requirement in greater depth). 
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evidence.  The single subject rule is both a mechanical conscription upon 
the internal workings of the legislature as well as a substantive regulation 
of the contents of legislative acts.  Both the supporters and opponents of 
Section 19 expected that the single subject rule would be enforced.  
Moreover, they uniformly expected that the courts would enforce the rule 
and its several purposes. 
Among the other forty single subject states, we find that most have 
also recognized the rule’s two principal purposes:  the prevention of 
logrolling and the preclusion of multi-subject acts.  Many have also 
recognized the rule’s minor purposes:  to ensure that all subjects enacted 
into law would be considered and approved on their own merits, to free 
legislators from the burden of voting for unpalatable measures in order to 
achieve the passage of favored ones, and to preserve the integrity and 
effectiveness of the gubernatorial veto.  Significantly, none of these states’ 
constitutions removes the single subject rule from the purview of the 
courts—invariably a reflection of the framers and ratifiers of these states 
that, like in Indiana, these states’ respective courts would enforce the 
single subject rule.  These legislatures were stripped of the authority to 
logroll and to pass multi-subject acts not by the courts, but by the framers and 
ratifiers. 
Bearing in mind these parameters and the commonalities among the 
forty-one single subject states, it should be possible to set forth a test for 
single subject analysis that would apply across all of the single subject 
states.  Curiously, in a bothersome trend throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, many of the very courts charged to enforce the single 
subject rule have come to nullify it through the decisional law.  Since so 
few courts had consulted or developed a detailed understanding of the 
single subject rule, this evolution is not surprising.  Now that such an 
assessment has been attempted, the issue of what framework or legal test 
should govern single subject analysis is ripe for consideration.  These and 
other concerns are addressed in a forthcoming Article by the authors.415 
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